


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New book from Yutopian Enterprises

A Journey in Search of the Origins of Go

by Shirakawa Masayoshi

An English translation of a book first published by the Nihon Ki-in in 1999. The author describes his numerous trips to China, where he investigated the origins of go. He shows the deep relationship between go and *Yi Jing* (also known as *I Ching*), the Chinese classic on divination. His main thesis is that the go board and stones were initially used as a tool for divination. He also shows how the Chinese calendar is closely related to the go board. Shirakawa cites numerous sources from Chinese history and literature as evidence for his theories.

Having personally worked with Go Seigen and attended many of his lectures, the author relates Go Seigen's theories on and insights into the origins of go.

One of the main contributions of this book for western go players is its thorough analysis of the rule of *kirichin*. In ancient China, where this rule was used, the players would fill in their territories at the end of the game until all of one player's groups were left with only two eyes. The player who still had territory left to fill was the winner. In this method of counting, connecting two groups was worth two points.

The main chapters are:

Chapter One. Go and *Three Kingdoms*

Chapter Two. The Origins and Philosophy of Go

Chapter Three. The Evolution of the Methods of Counting

Chapter Four. Go Strategy

Also included are a 5,000-year chronology of go in China and Japan, from ancient times to the present, and an extensive bibliography.

Shirakawa is a literary critic and writer. He is a lecturer at Kokugakuin University and Tokyo Keizai University. Among his works are *In Search of Dostoevsky* and *Complete Critical Essay on Hanaya Yutaka*. He was the chief editor of *Conversations on Go with Go Seigen* and the author of *Go is about Dividing*.

256 pages; price: US\$20.00 + shipping; ISBN 1-889554-98-7

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The cover: An oban print by Eizan titled *Furyu Goban Ningyo (The Elegant Dance of a Puppet on Go Board)*. The print shows a woman sitting on a go board, using her hands and a foot to help a child dance. Note the similarity of this print to the one by Utamaro on the cover of *Go World 94*. From the collection of Erwin Gerstorfer.

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Go World News

October 2005~mid-January 2006
by John Power

International



Cho Han-seung wraps up the Pusan Round with two wins to give Korea a one-win lead.

Korea has the edge in 7th Nong Shim Cup

The honours had been fairly evenly divided in the 7th Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup, but Korea took the lead at the end of the second round, played in Pusan in Korea, when Cho Han-seung won two games in a row. Japan fell a step behind when it lost the final game in this round; it now has only Yoda Norimoto left. Korea still has Cho and its ace, Yi Ch'ang-ho, and China has Kong Jie and Chang Hao. Korea could be said to have a slight edge, as it has won four games to three each for Japan and China, but one of the latter two could still dent its monopoly. In contrast to the 6th Cup, Korea's other players besides Yi are pulling their weight this time.

The final round will be held in Shanghai in February 2006.

Prize money in this tournament is 150 million won* for the winning team. Players who score three wins in a row get a bonus of ten million won. The playing fee is three million won per game.

* Exchange rates as we go to press are \$1 = ¥116 = 995 won = 8.1 yuan.

The Pusan Round

Game 5 (23 Nov.). Mimura Tomoyasu 9-dan (Japan) (W) d. Liu Xing 7-dan (China) by resig.

Game 6 (24 Nov.). Weon Seong-chin 6-dan (Korea) (B) d. Mimura by resig.

Game 7 (25 Nov.). Xie He 6-dan (China) (W) d. Weon by ½.

Game 8 (26 Nov.). Xie (B) d Yamada Kimio 8-dan (Japan) by resig.

Game 9 (27 Nov.). Cho Han-seung 8-dan (Korea) (B) d. Xie by resig.

Game 10 (28 Nov.). Cho (B) d. Takao Shinji 9-dan (Japan) by 2½.



Luo Xihe: a lightning-fast player wins his first world title.

Luo Xihe wins 10th Samsung Cup

The 10th Samsung Cup was a triumph for China, which secured six of the quarterfinal places, two of the semifinal places and a place in the final. The player reaching the final, Luo Xihe 9-dan, then defeated Yi Ch'ang-ho to score his first international triumph. This is the first time Luo has even taken a place in an international tournament, but, at 28, he is not a new face. In fact, he is well known to professionals from other countries because of the extreme speed with which he plays — it's unlikely there's a faster player around. In this term, the time allow-

ance was reduced from three to two hours per player, which perhaps explains his good results.

Twice before China has taken six of the quarterfinal places in an international tournament but failed to win it. On one occasion (the 7th Samsung), Cho Hun-hyeon was the reason; on the other (the 5th Chunlan), it was Yi. This time Korea was the one with six, but Luo made up for his country's past failures. With both finalists in the LG Cup also Chinese, China is on a roll.

The Samsung first prize is 200 million won; second is 50 million.

Quarterfinals (15, 16 November; Taejon)

(15 Nov.) Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) (B) d. Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan (Korea) by 5½; Luo Xihe 9-dan (China) (W) d. Yi Se-tol 9-dan (Korea) by resig.

(16 Nov.) Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 9-dan (Korea) (W) d. Cho Hun-hyeon 9-dan (Korea) by resig.; Hu Yaoyu 8-dan (China) (B) d. Kim Myeong-wan 7-dan (Korea) by resig.

Semifinals (13–16 December)

(13 Dec.) Yi (W) d. Hu by resig.; Luo (B) d. Ch'oe by resig.

(15 Dec.) Hu (W) d. Yi by 1½; Ch'oe (B) d. Luo by resig.

(16 Dec.) Yi (B) d. Hu by resig.; Luo (W) d. Ch'oe by 7½.

Final (Seoul)

Game 1 (10 Jan.). Luo (B) by resig.

Game 2 (12 Jan.). Yi (B) by 3½.

Game 3 (13 Jan.). Luo (B) by 5½.

10th LG Cup

There has been no more play in this tournament, but we now have full details of the semifinals, which were played in Beijing on 19 October. The final will be played in March.

Gu Li 7-dan (China) (B) d. Yi Se-tol 9-dan (China) by resig.; Chen Yaoye 5-dan (China) (B) d. Piao Wenyao 3-dan (China) by resig.

4th Cheongkwangjang Cup: New star for China

This is a tournament for five-player teams from China, Japan, and Korea. It started out as an individual tournament, but changed to a Nong Shim format in its third term. The first term was won by Rui Naiwei (representing Korea); the second by one of Rui's main rivals in Korea, Pak Chi-eun. As a team tournament, the 3rd term was won by China, with Rui playing on the top board. However, it went the full distance, that is, 14 games (details are given in GW103).

In the 4th term, China is doing even better, thanks to its newest star, the 16-year-old Wang Xiangyun* 1-dan. As reported in our previous issue (page 11), she won the 2005 Chinese Women's Championship as an amateur. She seems to have turned professional on the day, 26 September, that that tournament ended; soon after, she made her debut as the top batter for the Chinese team in the Cheongkwangjang Cup and won all four games in the opening round.

The other teams must have had nightmares of her winning the tournament single-handed, but, after one more win in the second round, someone was finally able to beat her. Her five-win streak was particularly costly for Japan: three of her losing opponents were Japanese. Japan recovered some ground when Chinen Kaori won three games in a row, but then China fielded its ace, Rui Naiwei. After two rounds, both Japan and Korea have been reduced to one player while China still has three, so it is in the box seat.

The final round will be played in Shanghai in mid-January. The prize for the winning team is 100 million won.

The Beijing Round

Game 1 (1 Nov.). Wang Xiangyun 1-dan (China) (B) d. Shinkai Hiroko 5-dan (Japan) by 4½.

Game 2 (2 Nov.). Wang (W) d. Kim Eun-seon 2-dan (Korea) by 2½.

Game 3 (3 Nov.). Wang (B) d. Mannami Kana 3-dan (Japan) by 3½.

Game 4 (4 Nov.). Wang (W) d. Yi Ta-hye 3-dan (Korea) by resig.

The Seoul Round

Game 5 (18 Dec.). Wang (B) d. Osawa Narumi 3-dan (Japan) by resig.

Game 6 (19 Dec.). Yi Min-chin 4-dan (Korea) (W) d. Wang by resig.

Game 7 (20 Dec.). Chinen Kaori 4-dan (Japan) (W) d. Yi by ½.

Game 8 (21 Dec.). Chinen (B) d. Han Weijing 1-dan (China) by resig.

Game 9 (22 Dec.). Chinen (W) d. Yi Yeong-sin 4-dan (Korea) by resig.

Game 10 (23 Dec.). Rui Naiwei 9-dan (China) (W) d. Chinen by resig.

Gu wins Japan–China Agon Kiriya Cup

Japan's newest star, the 16-year-old Iyama Yuta 7-dan, met China's number one, Gu Li 7-dan, in the final of the seventh annual play-off between the winners of the Japanese and Chinese

* In the previous issue, we mistakenly gave her given name as Shangyun.

Agon Kiriya Cup, but the greater experience of the 22-year-old Gu proved too much for Iyama. Taking white, he secured a resignation after 172 moves. The game was played on Hainan Island in China on 10 January.

China is now 3-4 in these play-offs.

Current international champions

5th Ing Cup: Chang Hao (China)
 2nd Toyota & Denso Cup: Yi Se-tol (Korea)
 18th Fujitsu Cup: Yi Se-tol
 10th Samsung Cup: Luo Xihe (China)
 5th Chunlan Cup: Yi Ch'ang-ho (Korea)
 9th LG Cup: Cho U (Japan)
 17th TV Asia Cup: Cho U
 2nd Zhonghuan: Ch'oe Ch'eol-han
 6th Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup: Korea
 4th CSK Cup: Korea
 3rd Cheongkwangjang Cup: China

Most world championships won

20: Yi Ch'ang-ho (+ 2 invitationals)
 11: Cho Hun-hyeon
 6: Takemiya Masaki, Yu Ch'ang-hyeok, Yi Se-tol
 4: Yoda Norimoto
 3: Yu Bin
 2: Otake Hideo, Ma Xiaochun, O Rissei, Cho Chikun, Pak Yeong-hun, Cho U
 1: Kobayashi Koichi, Rin Kaiho, Seo Pong-su, Zhou Heyang, Chang Hao, Ch'oe Ch'eol-han, Luo Xihe

(By country) Korea: 47; Japan: 20;
 China: 8

Team championships (Jinro, Nong Shim, Igo Asia/CSK)

Korea: 13 Japan: 1 China: 1

News from Japan

Cho U defends Meijin title

Kobayashi Satoru continued his tenacious fightback in the 30th Meijin title match, winning the sixth game to level the score. However, he was thwarted in the final game, when Cho U became only the second player (following Hane in the 2004 Kisei) to recover from losing the fourth to sixth games in a best-of-seven.

Kobayashi made the better start on the first day of the final game, but Cho fought back

strongly on the second day; the game seemed to be headed for an endgame contest when Cho made an aggressive placement that secured the lead.

This was Cho's fourth big-three win. He may have lost the Honinbo title earlier in the year, but winning it twice and the Meijin twice already establishes him as a major figure. Of his 12 titles, seven are top-seven and two are international titles, which is a very high proportion of big titles. Taking just the big three, which are the true measure of distinction in Japanese go, he is already equal 9th with Yoda for most titles won. The players ahead of him are:

1. Cho Chikun: 29
2. Kobayashi Koichi: 16
3. Rin Kaiho: 13
4. Takagawa Shukaku: 10
5. Sakata Eio: 9
6. Fujisawa Shuko: 8
7. Ishida Yoshio, Kato Masao: 6

Cho has just turned 26 (on 20 January). How far up this list will he be by the time he's 30?

The players are not competing just for glory. Cho earned 36 million yen for his efforts — enough to buy some presents for his first child, expected in March.

Game 1 (7, 8 Sept.). Cho U (B) by resig.

Game 2 (22, 23 Sept.). Cho (W) by 6½.

Game 3 (28, 29 Sept.). Cho (B) by resig.

Game 4 (11, 12 Oct.). Kobayashi (B) by 3½.

Game 5 (19, 20 Oct.). Kobayashi (W) by 1½.

Game 6 (3, 4 Nov.). Kobayashi (B) by ½.

Game 7 (9, 10 Nov.). Cho (W) by resig.

Top title winners (10+)

68: Cho Chikun	22: O Rissei
64: Sakata Eio	18: Takagawa Shukaku
59: Kobayashi Koichi	15: Shimamura Toshihiro
48: Otake Hideo	14: Yamashiro Hiroshi
47: Kato Masao	12: Hashimoto Utau, Cho U
35: Rin Kaiho, Yoda Norimoto	11: Hane Naoki
24: Ishida Yoshio, Takemiya Masaki	10: Sugiuchi Kazuko, Kobayashi Reiko,
23: Fujisawa Shuko	Kobayashi Izumi

Others: Yamashita Keigo: 9; Takao Shinji: 7

31st Meijin League

The vacant places in the new league were taken by three players making their league debuts: Han Zenki 7-dan, Ko Iso 7-dan, and Takao Shinji Honinbo. Of the three, only Takao was able to win his opening game.

31st Meijin league (8 December 2005 to August 2006)

Title-holder: Cho U

Rank	Player/opponent	KS	YK	IT	YK	SH	YN	TS	HZ	KI	Score
1	Kobayashi Satoru	—							1		1 - 0
2	Yamashita Keigo		—						0		0 - 1
3	Imamura Toshiya			—			0			0	0 - 2
4	Yamada Kimio				—					1	1 - 0
5	Sakai Hideyuki					—		0			0 - 1
6	Yoda Norimoto			1			—				1 - 0
7	Takao Shinji					1		—			1 - 0
7	Han Zenki	0	1						—		1 - 1
7	Ko Iso			1	0					—	1 - 1

Cho U defends Oza title

The 53rd Oza title match was surprisingly one-sided, with Cho U defeating the challenger, Yamashita Keigo Tengen, 3-0. This gave Cho his third Oza title in a row and his 12th title overall. His career has barely started, yet already he is 15th in the all-time lists (see above).

First prize is ¥13,500,000 (the same as the Tengen, but the latter is ranked higher).

Game 1 (28 Oct.). Cho (B) by resig.

Game 2 (21 Nov.). Cho (W) by resig.

Game 3 (1 Dec.). Cho (B) by 9½.

*Kono Rin***Kono Rin wins Tengen title match**

Another member of the younger generation has made the breakthrough into the elite group of titleholders. The 24-year-old Kono Rin was successful in his first challenge for a top-seven title, defeating Yamashita Keigo 3-2 to win the 31st Tengen title. Kono won his first title at the same

age as his teacher, Kobayashi Koichi, and it was the same title. This could be a good omen for his career.

Yamashita maintained his unenviable record of never having defended a title. His star is not shining as brightly as it did a couple of years ago. Losing two title matches in a row at the end of 2005 is not a good springboard for his return match with Hane Naoki in the Kisei title.

First prize is ¥13,500,000.

Game 1 (7 Nov.). Yamashita (W) by 6½.

Game 2 (17 Nov.). Kono (W) by 5½.

Game 3 (24 Nov.). Kono (B) by resig.

Game 4 (15 Dec.). Yamashita (B) by resig.

Game 5 (20 Dec.). Kono (W) by 4½.

Yamashita to challenge for Kisei title

The play-off to decide the challenger for the 30th Kisei title was held on 3 November, with the same pairing as the previous year. The result was almost the same, as Yuki Satoshi had a good position, but he slackened off late in the game and let Yamashita Keigo catch up. Playing black, Yamashita won by 3½ points; he thus secured a chance to take revenge for his loss of the Kisei title to Hane Naoki two years ago.

Apart from this win, Yamashita had disappointing results in the latter part of last year, but a seven-game match, in which you have the luxury of being able to lose three games, offers a good chance to regain form. He also has a good record against Hane, with 18 wins to nine losses, but he did lose that Kisei title match.

The first game will be played in Berlin on 15 and 16 January.

Kobayashi Izumi wins tenth title

In the final of the 7th Women's Strongest Player tournament, held on 8 December, Kobayashi Izumi 6-dan (W) beat Konishi Kazuko 8-

61st Honinbo league (6 October 2005 to spring 2006)

Title-holder: Takao Shinji

Rank	Player/opponent	CU	CS	YN	OM	HN	OR	YK	SY	Score
1	Cho U	—	1		1	1	1			4 – 0
2	Cho Sonjin	0	—		1	0			0	1 – 3
3	Yoda Norimoto			—		0		1	0	1 – 2
4	O Meien	0	0		—	0		0		0 – 4
5	Hane Naoki	0	1	1	1	—				3 – 1
5	O Rissei	0					—	0	1	1 – 2
5	Yamada Kimio			0	1		1	—	1	3 – 1
5	So Yokoku		1	1			0	0	—	2 – 2

dan of the Kansai Ki-in by 3½ points to win this title for the first time. First prize is ¥4,500,000.

This is Kobayashi's tenth title, so she draws level with his mother, the late Kobayashi (née Kitani) Reiko and Sugiuchi Kazuko 8-dan for most titles won by a woman. She is also the first player to win all four of the current women's titles.

Cho leads 61st Honinbo League

A clash between the joint leaders on 6 January may, in retrospect, prove to have been the key game in the Honinbo league. Cho U Meijin defeated Hane Naoki Kisei and so took the sole lead. At this point, Cho's chances of a rematch with Takao look good.

Incidentally, we had an unusual position after the second round, with a clear division between winners and losers: four players had two wins and four had two losses.

49th Kansai Ki-in Number One Position championship

In the final, Yokota Shigeaki 9-dan beat Nakano Yasuhiro 8-dan to win this title for the first time.

Game 1 (3 Nov.). Yokota (B) by resig.

Game 2 (12 Nov.). Yokota (W) by 1½.

Yamashiro wins 46th Okan title

Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan has won the Okan (Crown) title, which is open only to players at the Nagoya branch of the Nihon Ki-in, for the 14th time. In the final of the 46th title, held on 28 November, Yamashiro (B) beat the titleholder Hane Naoki Kisei by resignation.

First prize is ¥1,300,000.

Amateur Honinbo beats professional Honinbo

This annual play-off was held on 4 December

between newcomers to each title. Hiraoka Satoshi, taking two stones and receiving a komi of 6½ points, beat Takao Shinji Honinbo by five points. If he had lost, the amateur side would have had to take three stones in the next play-off. Takao was satisfied because he won on the board.

Takemiya Masaki sets successive-wins record, wins backgammon tournament

Takemiya Masaki 9-dan has been enjoying good form recently. In the second half of 2005, he won 16 games in a row, which is the record for the year. Shortly after his winning streak was finally broken, on 24 December, he won Japan's top backgammon tournament, the 12th Saint of the Board title. He has been a keen backgammon player for three decades.

Promotions

To 9-dan: Yamada Kimio (for 200 wins as an 8-dan; Yamada is the first player to make 9-dan by the new cumulative-wins system)

To 8-dan: Kono Rin (for winning the Tengen title).

Retirements

Tono Hiroaki 9-dan (Kansai Ki-in) (as of autumn 2005); Magari Reiki 9-dan; Ito Makoto 8-dan; Homma Akio 7-dan; Nishimoto Kinya 2-dan.

News from Korea**Kang wins 9th New Stars Pro Best Ten**

Appropriately enough, this tournament — the SK Gas Cup New Stars Pro Best Ten, to give it its full name — was won by a 16-year-old player

who suddenly rose out of the ruck in the latter half of 2005. He is Kang Dong-yun 4-dan, whom we introduced in our previous issue (page 10). In the final, he defeated Ko Keun-t'ae 3-dan, who is 18, 2-0.

Game 1 (3 Nov.). Kang (W) by resig.
Game 2 (16 Nov.). Kang (B) by resig.

Ch'oe wins 10th GS-Caltex Professional Go Tournament

The 10th GS-Caltex title match progressed very slowly because of an outside complication: Ch'oe Ch'eol-han's call-up. All Korean men have to serve two years in the military; go players are exempted only if they win a major international title, and Ch'oe's Zhonghuan Cup in August didn't qualify. After the third game, there was a delay of six weeks, as he had to report for a month's basic training in the army on 17 October. Presumably he played the fourth game and fifth games while on leave, but we don't have full details. In any case, he overcame the distraction of military training and continued his fight-back from his bad start to win the title.

Ch'oe thus maintained his excellent record against Korea's number one. In 2004, he beat Yi Ch'ang-ho in the Kuksu and Kiseong; in 2005, he lost the Etland Cup to him but beat him in the Kuksu and in this title.

Game 1 (8 Sept.). Yi (B) by resig.
Game 2 (21 Sept.). Yi (W) by resig.
Game 3 (6 Oct.). Ch'oe (W) by resig.
Game 4 (21 Nov.). Ch'oe (B) by resig.
Game 5 (1 Dec.). Ch'oe (B) by resig.

Ko wins 10th Bacchus Chunweon Cup

Ko Keun-t'ae 3-dan had to be content with second place in the 9th New Stars, but he did better in the 10th Bacchus Chunweon Cup, defeating Pak Cheong-keun 1-dan 3-1 to take the title.

A few years ago, this title was being contested by 9-dans, yet now we have a 3-dan versus a 1-dan, both of them unknown to us until very recently. It's a sign of the extraordinary pool of go talent that has been developed in Korea — in Japan, the idea of a 1-dan contesting an open title would be inconceivable.

Game 1 (24 Nov.). Ko (B) by resig.
Game 2 (2 Dec.). Ko (W) by ½.
Game 3 (14 Dec.). Pak (W) by 2½.
Game 4 (19 Dec.). Ko (W) by resig.

Women's Myeongin title tied

The 7th Women's Myeongin title match, in which Cho Hye-yeon 6-dan is challenging Rui Naiwei 9-dan, is tied. The deciding game will be played on 27 January.

Game 1 (7 Jan.). Rui (W) by 2½.
Game 2 (11 Jan.). Cho (W) by resig.

Top prize-money winners in 2005

Not surprisingly, the top earners in Korea in 2005 were the three players who dominated the tournament scene. Yi Se-tol earned 610 million won, with the Fujitsu Cup and Toyota & Denso Cup prizes making big contributions. Yi Ch'ang-ho was second with 490 million won, and Ch'oe Ch'eol-han third with 468 million.

News from China



Zhang Xuan

Zhang wins 3rd Jianqiao Cup

Zhang Xuan 8-dan defeated Zheng Yan 2-dan 2-0 to win the 3rd Jianqiao Cup Women's Igo Open Tournament, which was held from 7 to 16 November. Zhang has monopolized this title: in the first year, when the final was just one game, she defeated Huang Jia 2-dan; last year she defeated Zheng Yan 2-1.

The prize money seems to have been raised to 100,000 yuan (last year it was 30,000).

Gu defends Mingren title

Yu Bin 9-dan became the challenger to Gu Li for the 18th Mingren title by defeating Luo Xihe 9-dan in the play-off, but he fared badly in the title match, failing to win a game.



Gu Li

Best-of-three to decide the challenger

Game 1 (3 Sept.). Luo Xihe (W) by resig.

Game 2 (5 Sept.). Yu (W) by resig.

Game 3 (6 Sept.). Yu (W) by resig.

The title match

Game 1 (13 Dec.). Gu (W) by 2½.

Game 2 (15 Dec.). Gu (B) by resig.

Game 3 (11 Jan.). Gu (B) by resig.

7th Agon Kiriya Cup

This is the sister tournament to the Japanese Agon Kiriya Cup. In the final of the 7th Cup, Gu Li 7-dan (W) beat Qiu Jun 7-dan by resignation to secure his second victory in this tournament. The game was played on 22 November. First prize is 200,000 yuan, with 80,000 yuan going to the player in second place.

Zhou wins 2nd Changqi Cup

This tournament is sponsored by the Ing Chang-ki Go Education Foundation in Shanghai. There are 24 participants, made up of the top 14 players in the rating system, the top-rated woman player, and one player from Taiwan, with the remaining eight places decided by a qualifying tournament.

The first term was won by Kong Jie 7-dan, who beat Wang Lei 8-dan 2-1 in March 2005, but the tournament is not run by the challenger system, so the winner starts out again in the final section of the tournament. Despite this handicap, Kong Jie won his way to the final again, but here he was outplayed by Zhou Heyang 9-dan.

The tournament carries China's top prize of 400,000 yuan, with 100,000 yuan for second place.

Game 1 (5 Jan.). Zhou (W) by resig.

Game 2 (7 Jan.). Zhou (B) by resig.

Gu wins NEC Lightning Go Cup

Gu Li certainly seems to be the in-form player at the moment in China. In the final of the 11th NEC Cup (14 January), Gu (B) defeated Liu Shizhen 6-dan to take the 200,000-yuan first prize. Liu had to be content with 50,000 yuan.

Ratings update

Below is the latest ratings list to hand. No date is given for it, but it was probably issued in early winter. (Our source is the January 2006 issue of *Igo*.) Although some of the places have changed, there are no new faces in the top ten.

- | | |
|----------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Gu Li: 2693 | 6. Xie He: 2645 |
| 2. Kong Jie: 2686 | 7. Chang Hao: 2635 |
| 3. Zhou Heyang: 2678 | 8. Qiu Jun: 2632 |
| 4. Hu Yaoyu: 2663 | 9. Yu Bin: 2630 |
| 5. Wang Lei: 2658 | 10. Wang Xi: 2621 |


Correction

The given name of the go writer we have been calling Matsuura Takahito should be Takamoto.

Dr. Paduk's Life-and-death Problem

Kim Hyonjon 3-dan is a Korean who is a member of the Central Japan (Nagoya) branch of the Nihon Ki-in. She often visits her homeland and her sister, Kim Hyo-cheong, is a professional at the Hanguk Kiwon.

Kim has been writing a column in *Go Weekly* about topics related to Korea and Korean go. In the 5 December 2005 issue, she wrote about Kweon O-min 4-dan, who is famous for his skill as a composer of life-and-death problems and for his all-round knowledge about go. Some of his problems were said to be too difficult even for Yi Ch'ang-ho, but Kim introduced one that is a little easier.



Black to play and live

Black lives with a beautiful shape.

Answer on page 64.

The 18th Fujitsu Cup: Yi Se-tol vs. Ch'oe Ch'eol-han

For the sixth time, the final of the Fujitsu Cup was fought between two Korean players. Yi Se-tol had already won this tournament twice, but Ch'oe Ch'eol, although established as a top player in Korea, mainly thanks to his victories over Yi Ch'ang-ho in domestic title matches, had not yet won an international title. Yi was 22 and Ch'oe was 20.

White: Yi Se-tol 9-dan

Black: Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 9-dan.

Played at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo on 4 July 2005. *Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.*





Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). Immediate fighting

Back 23. Starting a fight when Black has allies at the top is natural. The peaceful approach would be to play Black A-White 23-Black 43.

When Black cuts, the continuation is more or less a one-way street.



Dia. 1: a resilient group

Figure 2 (51-100). Yi takes the lead.

Black's play with 57 on is negative. This is his chance to set his stones at the top in motion with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1*. White will be reluctant to attack Black's eye shape with 'a' unless he is

certain of killing the group, as otherwise 'a' loses points. Also, if Black gets a stone at 'b', White's corner shape will be the carpenter's square, which is unsettled. In short, it would be very hard for White to attack this group.

White takes a definite lead when he forces up to 62, then captures the top group cleanly with 66.





Figure 2 (51-100)



Dia. 2: White is satisfied

Yi is known for his skill at wrapping up a win once he gets ahead. With 50 points of secure territory at the top, he just has to stop Black getting a big territory at the bottom. First of all, he settles his bottom left group while taking territory with 68 on, then tries to settle the bottom right.

Black 95. If Black plays the standard tesuji combination of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*, White will let him capture on top in exchange for linking up on the edge. This will be good enough for White, which is why Black counters with 95 etc. in the figure.

However, there was a simple oversight in Yi's analysis. In retrospect, he should have lived

in the corner with 84 at 90, followed by Black 91 and White A.





Figure 3 (101-150)
33: connects (at 26)



Dia. 3: can't atari

Figure 3 (101-150). A simple oversight

Yi must have become overconfident after taking the lead. It's the only way to explain his overlooking the simple placement of 7.

White has no choice but to increase his liberties with 10 to 14, then try to pull off something on the outside after cutting at 16. If he plays 10 at 14, Black hanes at 12 and wins the capturing race.

Note that White 1 in *Dia. 3* instead of 14 doesn't work: White can't atari.

The continuation from 17 to 37 is a one-way street. White then presses at 38: his aim is to force Black to remove the captured white stones from the board. That would mean a loss for Black, so he desperately tries to extricate himself.

Black 43. Black can't play at 49, as White can cut with White 50, followed by White A and White B.

Figure 4 (151-175). Mistakes by both

Black does manage to pull himself through a carefully timed sequence. If White plays 52 at

57, Black captures him with 2 and 4 in *Dia. 4*. However, White is satisfied with building thickness in the centre with 52 on. This gives him the lead.






Figure 4 (151-175)
58: ko (at 52); 72: connects (above 52)




Dia. 4: Black wins



Dia. 5: correct for 60

White 60 is careless, however. Correct is White 1 in *Dia. 5*. Black has to play 2 to 6 to keep ahead in the capturing race with White, but 3 and 5 help White and make 7 a good follow-up. White's group is safe, as he has the cutting point of 'a' [there's a geta now, but it disappears if Black tries to cut, beginning with 69 in the figure].

White 66. White would like to play at 1 in *Dia. 6*, then switch to 5 in the centre. However, Black defends his cutting point in sente with 6, then cuts off and kills the group with 8. That's why White 60 in the game was a mistake.



Dia. 6: White dies

White therefore has to enclose the centre with 66 without any preparatory moves, but this is too thin. His lead is now precarious.

Black 67 is bad: the exchange for 68 gives White the cut of A. Black 67 is not necessary; if Black had omitted it and just switched to the endgame of 77 etc. in the next figure, the game would have been promising for him.






Figure 5 (176-200)

Figure 6 (176-200). Ch'oe's last chance


Black 83 is Ch'oe's last stab at victory. However, Black 87 is a mediocre move that is quite unlike Ch'oe. This is Black's chance to make the placement at 1 in *Dia. 7*. Trying to capture everything with White 2 is unreasonable. On the contrary, it is White's centre group that is captured. Therefore —



Dia. 7: resistance is unreasonable



Dia. 8: White wins



Dia. 9: Black wins

Dia. 8. White must compromise with 2. Black gets a much better result with 3 and 5 than in the game. The question now is whether White would be cool enough in the heat of battle to reinforce with 6. If so, then after the continuation to 14 he still keeps a small lead. Instead of 6 —

Dia. 9. If White 6 here, Black wins.

Black 1 in *Dia. 7* was Black's last chance to create complications. After this he is no longer in the game.

No wonder Yi said in the press conference after the game that this was the most difficult of his three Fujitsu victories. This game shows that taking an early lead can actually make it very tough for you.

Concluded on page 67.

The 29th Kisei Title Match: Hane Naoki vs. Yuki Satoshi

This title match was eagerly awaited by fans of the Kansai Ki-in, Japan's number two professional go organization, which is centred on Osaka: it was the first time that one of its members had appeared in a best-of-seven title match since 1977, when Hashimoto Uтарo played (but lost) in the inaugural Kisei title match.

For fans of the Kansai Ki-in player concerned, Yuki Satoshi, there was a strong sense of 'it's about time'. He has been the leading Kansai Ki-in player for some years now, but his only challenges for top-seven titles had been two unsuccessful ones for the Gosei title, though he had picked up five lesser titles. Rin Kaiho started off his live commentary on satellite TV by saying, 'We've kept you waiting.' Everyone knew what he meant.

Of course, Hane Naoki's fans were just as fervent in their support. He is the first Nagoya player to win a big-three title, so in a sense he had put Nagoya on the go map. This title match probably had additional importance to him because it was a chance to prove himself again. After winning the Kisei title last year, he had gone into a slump and ended the year with the first negative record of his career (see box on page 14). At the end of the year, he had lost his Tengen title to Yamashita Keigo. Moreover, during the year he had compiled a dishonourable record in international tournaments of ten straight losses (part of a losing streak of 15 that extended from April 2003 to May 2005).

A number of players have won a top title for one term, then failed to defend it; as Hane commented, 'defending a title shows that you're the real thing'. Both players had a lot to play for in this, the first-ever Nagoya–Osaka contest in a big-three title match.

The prize the players were vying for was 42 million yen.

Game One: Going toe-to-toe

White: Hane Naoki Kisei

Black: Yuki Satoshi 9-dan

Komi: 6½; time: 8 hours each

Played at the Hotel Okura Niigata in Niigata City on 12 & 13 January 2005.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan. Report by Akamatsu Masahiro.

This game set the tone for the series: nonstop fighting from the outset. This was a little surprising: one might have expected Hane to avoid the aggressive infighting that was known to be Yuki's forte, but Hane was determined not to be cowed by his opponent. In fighting spirit, he certainly didn't come off second.





Figure 1 (1-34)



Dia. 1: White is satisfied

Figure 1 (1-34). Furious fighting


This game got off to a very slow start, mainly because a very difficult fight erupted immediately in the bottom left corner. We've indicated the time where it was significant.

For Black 7 (25 minutes), the usual move is the pincer of 24, in which case the attachment of

8 (58 minutes) doesn't work (White can't play 14 in the figure).


Black 9 (34 minutes). If at 1 in *Dia. 1*, the continuation to 11 can be expected, after which White plays at 12 or 'a'. White would be satisfied; presumably Yuki wanted to avoid this result.

The moves from 10 to 16 were all played immediately. The next difficult move was 17, over which Yuki took 63 minutes. Black 17 is correct; if instead he blocks at 1 in *Dia. 2*, White hanes at 2, then cuts at 4, putting Black on the spot. The sequence to 16 follows, and the result is good for White: his capture of the two outside stones is superior to Black's corner capture. If instead of 3 Black resists by jumping to 1 in *Dia. 3*, attaching at 2 is a strong counter. Black can't handle the fight after White 12.



Dia. 2: good for White Dia. 3: good for White 11: ko

White 18 (52 minutes). After the game, Hane commented that he should first have pushed up and cut with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4*. Concerning the result to 11, Kobayashi commented that it was 'quite playable for White'.



Dia. 4: correct Dia. 5: bad style

Black took 81 minutes over 19, so just three moves had taken over three hours — both sides were really playing in earnest. Like 18, Black 19 is the only move (presumably the players were spending their time reading out the continuations). Turning at 1 in *Dia. 5* is bad style. White

extends at 2; continuing to push just helps White, so Black will slide to 3. However, pushing down bluntly with White 4 is good; White now lives in the corner with 6 to 10. Black 11 to White 16 will probably follow. Kobayashi commented that 'White can handle this fight.' The eye shape of Black's group at the bottom is thin.


White 22 took 52 minutes and took the time to 4:42 p.m. Players can seal a move any time from 4:30 on. Yuki sealed his next move, after spending eight minutes thinking. The 40 minutes remaining until the official close of play at 5:30 was shared by the players.

This was the second smallest number of moves played on the first day of a Kisei title game. The record low was 20 moves, played in the third game of the 21st match, when Kobayashi Satoru challenged Cho Chikun.

Black 23 is the only move. It's a good sealed move, as there's no possibility of the player having second thoughts later.

After 24, the continuation to 30 is inevitable. Black now throws in a cut at 31, then adds a stone at 33.

White 34 took 77 minutes. Pushing along at 1 in *Dia. 6* is out of the question. Black switches to 2 and 4 and profits from the exchange; White suddenly falls behind. Moreover, the exchange of the marked stones now becomes an ideal forcing exchange for Black [the marked black stone can escape; if Black played it after White 3, White would atari to the right, so it would have no aji].



Dia. 6: good for Black Dia. 7: feasible

Another possibility for 34 is to atari at 1 in *Dia. 7* and to keep pushing up with 3 to 7. After

9, Black would press at 10 or jump to 'a'. This would give a difficult game.

Kobayashi: 'There are a lot of slow moves, but none of the thinking time is wasted. Each move has profound meaning; it's great for the spectator.'

Experiencing heaven and hell in the same year

The title above is a little exaggerated, but 2004 was certainly a year of mixed fortunes for Hane. After making an ideal start to the year by taking the Kisei title, he then experienced the worst slump of his career, ending the year with a minus record, for the first time ever, of 19 wins to 26 losses.

Various reasons can be surmised for this slump. One may have been the pressure of holding the top title, another the new komi of 6½. Hane referred to both in an interview:

'Previously, if the game was even, I had confidence when the endgame began, and I enjoyed the endgame contest. Recently, things are tougher. Playing with black, I agonize about how to find that extra point . . . Another thing is that if I happen to think during the game that I have to play good go, befitting the Kisei, things go wrong.'

Hane did even worse on the international stage, losing ten games straight. For what it's worth, the translator's theory about this slump sees one cause in the 2004 CSK Cup. Yamashita and Hane had fought a very tough match in the Kisei title, with the latter winning the first three games, then the former making a dramatic comeback by winning the next three. Hane then turned the tide again in the 7th game and won the match, which finished on 18 March. With hardly any time to rest, the two had to fly to Okinawa to compete in the CSK Cup, which started on 21 March. They would both have been physically and emotionally drained by the two-month-long struggle; not surprisingly, neither won a game. This experience could not have helped Hane's self-confidence; it may have helped precipitate the slump that plagued him for most of the year after that.

Just for the record, Hane did better in international games in 2005, scoring 9–9.





Figure 2 (35–80)



Dia. 8: what everyone expected
5: connects

Figure 2 (35–80). Black falls behind.

White 38. Imamura Toshiya 9-dan had studied this move in the pressroom, but concluded it was bad for White. However, Hane played it immediately. Black took 36 minutes on 39, after which the forced continuation to 42 followed in a flash. Black 43 surprised all the players in the pressroom; they had expected Black to push through at 1 in Dia. 8.


Dia. 8. If Black 1, the moves to 5 are forced. White 6 to 8 can then be expected. Next, Black presses at 9. White 'a' and Black 'b' would then be likely. 'This looks like an easier game for Black,' said Kobayashi. White may seem to have taken profit through his tesujis [38 etc. in the

figure], but in this diagram Black has only about five points less than he gets in the figure, and he hasn't made White thick.

Yuki's plan is to seek compensation for the thickness he has given White up to 46 by setting his stone in motion with 47. The continuation to 51 is forced. For 52, the proper move is White A, but Hane plays more aggressively with 52, preparing for the coming fight at the bottom. 'I understand how he feels,' Kobayashi commented.

Black 53 is provocative. More peaceful would be extending to Black 54, which White would answer at B. Next, Black could either try to settle the top left corner by pressing at C or secure the bottom territory by jumping down to 62. Presumably Yuki extended as far as 53 because he was not satisfied with the result of the initial fight. Naturally enough, Hane accepts the challenge by invading with 54.

Black 55. 'Splendid. The only move,' was Kobayashi's reaction. In contrast, White 56, which seeks life at the bottom, was not well received in the pressroom, where the players were united in recommending White 1 in *Dia. 9*. After the game, Yuki and Hane worked out the continuation to 9. Kobayashi's evaluation: 'White gets a solid position in the corner, so this is superior to the game.'




Dia. 9: better for White

Black is satisfied when he makes good shape with 57. White's position is thin and doesn't feel good. Hane commented later that he thought he had made the game tough for himself at this point.

White has no choice about 58; the game would become unwinnable if he let Black play here.

The peep of 60 is risky, but Black goes wrong in not connecting. If Black 1 in *Dia. 10*, then after White 2 Black can reinforce in sente with 3. White 4 is the vital point for eye shape, but having to answer 5 by living with 6 is painful. If, however, White blocks at 'a', Black attacks his eye shape with 'b', which is frighten-

ing. Black switches to 7 and has 'a slightly easier game than White,' according to Kobayashi.




Dia. 10: connecting is best

After 62 and 64, White is aiming at 74. It's now harder for Black to find a winning line.

Black 69 is necessary. White 70 is an impressive move. 'White's read it out through fighting spirit' (Kobayashi). The eye shape of White's group looks a little forlorn, but Black also has defects, so Hane believes he can handle the fight.

It's hard to know what to do when the opponent defies you to attack. Black 71 was the move predicted in the pressroom, but actually it was quite dubious. Better would be to play 1 to 5 in *Dia. 11*, then to press at 7. This alleviates the threat of White 'a' and sets up double threats: stealing the eye shape of the bottom group with 'b' and pulling out two stones with 'c'. This would give an even game, according to Kobayashi.



Dia. 11: an even game

White 72 is a superb counterpunch. It shows that Hane is just as strong in defence as in attack. Giving White the peep of 74 is painful. Note, though, that for 76 White D is actually the proper move.

In this exchange of just a few moves, Black has lost the equivalent of half a move. It will be difficult to make up this loss. The game is now a tough one for Black: he has to pull off something special.






Figure 3 (81-100)



Dia. 12: good for White



Dia. 13: good for White

Figure 3 (81-100). The climax approaches.

Black attacks with 81, but what happens if he forces with Black 82 first, that is, 1 in *Dia. 12*? White has a good answer to 1 and 3: playing an atari with 4, then reinforcing with 6. Now, if Black attaches at 'a', White can live with 'b' and he can also aim at counterattacking. Black 7 and 9 are the strongest moves, but White can't be sealed in after 10. 'Black collapses' was Kobayashi's succinct comment.

White 82 is a good move. White 84 is also shrewd: it makes 88 definitely sente. [Without 84, Black could counter 88 with 98.]

White 90 starts the decisive fight. Black has no choice about 91. If instead he plays at 1 in *Dia. 13*, the continuation to 5 is forced. White then has the good combination of 6 and 8, leading to the exchange to 12. The result is that all of White's groups have lived, so he has no worries, but Black's groups are still insecure, as the two white stones in the centre retain a lot of vitality. The game is good for White. For that reason, the moves to 94 in the figure are forced.

Black expands the battlefront with 95. White 96 is a tenacious move: the once-weak white group settles itself with ten points of territory and aims at the aji of pushing up at A. Black forestalls that with 97 and 99. If instead Black sealed in the white group on the side with B, White would jump to C, endangering the large bottom group.




Figure 4 (101-132)

Figure 4 (101-132). The losing move

Black 1 is the losing move: Black must jump to 1 in *Dia. 14* instead. White will atari at 2, then move out with 4. Black follows suit with 5. This leaves White with three unstable groups, in the centre, on the left side, and in the top left corner. Black also has three groups that are not alive, but this result is not yet a definite loss for him. Hane had less than 40 minutes of time left, while Yuki still had over an hour, so he could have staked the game on starting another fight.

The peep of White 2 is shrewd: it sets up White A for use in an emergency. Next, White links up with 4, making this fight an easy one for




A confident start by Hane. Watching the game review is Rin Kaiho.

him. Kobayashi surmised that Yuki might already have lost his will to fight by this point.

White 14 and 16 are crude but effective. Black has no choice about 17.

White 22 is perfectly timed: this is the finishing blow.




Dia. 14: Black still has a chance

When Black peeped at 5, Hane used a large part of his remaining time, 22 minutes, on his answer.

White 10. White could win more comfortably if he played at 15. Perhaps Hane had it all read out. He went into byo-yomi on this move.

Black presses at 11 to try to set up a capturing race, but he knows this is unreasonable. He is setting the scene for resignation.



Dia. 15: hopeless for Black

Black 23. If Black connects tightly at 1 in Dia. 15, then after White cuts he has to fill in White's liberties with 3 to 7. The result on the inside is a seki, but Black has no way to deal with the lethal cut of 8. This would be hopeless.

After 32, all Black can do is to get a gote seki, so White will cut to the right of 29 (as with

8 in *Dia. 15*) — Black will lose something on the outside. He has no choice but to resign.

This game featured one fight after another. Hane matched the aggressive challenger blow for blow, but, if anything, it was his slightly superior skill at defence that decided the issue.

Kobayashi: 'I was enthralled by a great game. The theory about Hane being in bad form was blown away. I predict the succeeding games will follow the same pattern.'

This prediction was accurate. There was no let-up in the unbridled aggression that marked this game.

Black resigns after White 132.

(The Yomiuri Newspaper)

Kansai Ki-in renaissance

Another exaggerated title — from several points of view. It's not as if Kansai players have been doing all that badly in recent years; on the other hand, they haven't actually taken a top-seven title for some time. However, the profile of the Kansai Ki-in has certainly been raised recently. Yuki Satoshi (aged 32) has been doing well in the Kisei tournament and has won some fast-go titles; Imamura Toshiya (age 38), who is the director of the Liaison Department at the Kansai Ki-in, has been enjoying good results in the Meijin league, coming close to winning it in 2004; the newest star is Sakai Hideyuki (age 31), who has also done well in the Meijin league.

The only disappointment is that younger players have not yet made their mark. A couple of years ago, Seto Taiki (born on 27 March 1984) was looking like a future star in the making, but he has not made the next step to become a contender, though he is still young. Further in the future, big things are expected of Murakawa Daisuke (15 in December), who qualified as a professional while still in elementary school (he was 11 years ten months old, which lowered Yuki Satoshi's record for the youngest Kansai Ki-in player by two months).

Game Two: Yuki fights back

White: Yuki Satoshi

Black: Hane Naoki

Played in Hawai Hot Spring, Yurihama, Shimane Prefecture on 26 & 27 January 2005.

Commentary by Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan. Report by Sano Makoto.







Figure 1 (1-26)



Dia. 1: no ladder



Dia. 2: good for White



Dia. 3: Kataoka's preference

Figure 1 (1-26). Majestic scale


The approach move of 10 is the premise for attaching at 12. If Black blocks at 1 in *Dia. 1* instead of 13, White cuts at 2; after the continuation to 6, Black can't get a ladder with 7.

Pulling back with Black 17 seems to be the right move. If instead Black makes a diagonal connection at 1 in *Dia. 2*, White takes sente with

2, then makes what is an ideal extension at 4. There is now no place for the thickness that Black has just built at the top to work, so Black can't follow this variation.

In contrast, Black 19 is a move for which various alternatives are conceivable. In the game, Black builds up a position on a majestic scale up to 25 — Hane presumably believed that this was a reasonable strategy to base his game on. It's impossible that this could be bad for Black, but after White 26 one could say that the result is just a little slack. If I were playing, I would perhaps use 19 to follow *Dia. 3*.

Black 21. Note that playing a pincer at 1 in *Dia. 4* in the expectation that White 'a' and Black 2 would follow would be self-indulgent reading. Instead, White will play at 2. If then Black 'a', White will cut at 'b', starting a fight that's very unfavourable for Black.



Dia. 4: not what Black wants

Figure 2 (27–67). A superb turning move

Pushing along and cutting with 29 and 31 is essential. Crawling along the third line with Black 49 would leave Black with too much of a low position, considering the location of 27.

White's one-space jump to 34 is an unusual move, but it seems to have been a really good one. I was filled with admiration. Would White usually slide to 1 in *Dia. 5*? There's a danger that after the sequence to 5 Black will play at 6. The continuation I give here is perhaps a little biased in Black's favour, but it looks like a very good result for him. With 8 to 12, he sacrifices the group on the side and blocks off the centre, which works well with his thickness on the left side.






Figure 2 (27–67)



Dia. 5: interesting for Black



Dia. 6: alternative strategy

White 40 is a superb turning move. Consequently, I think Black could have considered using 39 to push along with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6*. If White later plays at 'a', Black answers at 'b', and he won't be captured without extracting a price. This is how I might have played.

The skirmish from White 54 on is the main focal point of the early middle game. Black can't surrender the line on which he plays with 61 to White. If he simply turns at 67, White pushes down at 62 and links up to his stones at the bottom, turning the game in a flash into one that is unwinnable for Black. In order to make good use of his left-side thickness, Black has to seek his win in the midst of fighting.





Figure 3 (68-95)



Dia. 7: not profitable for White


Figure 3 (68-95). Game psychology

White 70. If instead White plays at 1 in Dia. 7, Black lives with 2 to 10, and the result is just that White has lost his eye shape. That means that the sequence to 79 in the figure is inevitable.

White 80. I heard that after the game Hane asked, 'Mightn't it have been sufficient to live tightly with White 81?' That's certainly possible. After all, what with the excellent turning move of 40 in the previous figure, the flow of the game feels slightly favourable for White.

However, actual game psychology makes it very hard for you to play a move that does nothing but live. My feeling is that you can't criticize White 80. After all, White is ready to go all out on the rear side with 86 to 90 when Black peeps at 85. Not only does this eliminate the disturbing aji of Black A-White B-Black C, it also expands the bottom area; if Black pushes through at D instead of 91, White can counter with 92 (which makes miai of 93 and E).

Black 95. If Black plays in the centre with 1 in Dia. 8, White plays 2, then dips down with 4, leaving Black with no continuation. Even if he continues attacking by main force with 5 to 11, White has scope to make eye shape with the squeeze from White 'a' to 'e', so he will just switch to 12, pushing up in the centre. Black will find his attack has led nowhere.



Dia. 8: an ineffective attack





Figure 4 (96-110)

Figure 4 (96-110). Not a dubious move

The way White looks after his centre group is going to decide the game. I don't think this is the kind of group that will easily pop off, but the position is not such that simply making two eyes will be good enough. If White suffers damage elsewhere in the process of saving the group, there's a possibility, depending on the degree of the damage, that saving it will not give him a good position. In short, the game is a good contest, and we have reached the most critical point of the fight.




Dia. 9: bad for White

White 96 to 102 are what can be expected. If there is a problem in the play here, it comes with Black 103. Instead —


Dia. 9. Black could also have considered connecting at 1. The variation here is very interesting, so I would like to look at it in detail.

If White wants to offer the strongest resistance, he makes the two-step hane of 2 and 4. Black cuts at 5, then plays 7 and 9. When White blocks at 10, he hanes in at 11, then lives up to 19. That means that the large white group in the centre automatically drops off, so instead of blocking at 10 —


Dia. 10. The diagonal move of 1 offers more tenacious resistance. When Black cuts with 2 and 4, White takes away Black's eye shape with 5. After 6 to 10, White dances out with the knight's move of 11, and Black's group is the one that drops off (if Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c', White 'd'—Black 'e'—White 'f' works just right to set up a ladder. At least, that's what one might think, but instead —



Dia. 10: White resists...



Dia. 11: brilliancy




Dia. 12: Black can cut

Dia. 11. Black has the brilliancy of 1. A tough capturing race follows after 3, but Black wins it by one move, with six liberties to White's five. Note that instead of 2 —

Dia. 12. If White plays at 2, then, after Black 3 and White 4, Black can push in at 5 — this shows how effective Black 1 is (White can't get the ladder in *Dia. 10*). If instead White plays 2 at 3, Black plays 'a'; if instead White 2 at 'b', Black plays 3—White 4—Black 'c'—White 5—Black 2.

Consequently, White 2 and 4 in *Dia. 9* don't work, so instead of 2 —



Dia. 13: a close game

Dia. 13. The conclusion is that White has no choice but to live with 2 and 4. After this, the most reasonable continuation would be for Black to attack at the vital point of 5 and White to capture a stone with 6 and 8. It's hard to say who gets the better of it in this result, so it looks like a good contest. There are still lots of places to play, and there are a number of unknowns. The game would probably become a perilous end-game contest.

For the above reasons, my conclusion is that using 103 to connect at 106 would not have been a game-deciding move. That in turn means that

103 was not a dubious move. As before, an extremely difficult fight continues with 104 to 110.

There are problems that strike one when one reviews the course of this game — letting White turn with 40 in Figure 2 may have been dubious and perhaps White should have used 80 in Figure 3 to live immediately with 81 — but I can't discover any moves that, at least to my eyes, can be labeled as clearly dubious. As in the opening game of the series, this is an extremely high-level fight.

White has no choice but to cut with 110 and to try to save his group by exploiting Black's thinness on the left side and at the bottom.





Figure 5 (111-128)



Dia. 14: brute force

Figure 5 (111-128). 'No sense of danger'

White will easily be able to settle his group if he can attach at A. Consequently, Black needs to add a stone in the neighbourhood, but, although the exchange of 11 and 12 is OK, the continuation of 13 is bad. This became Hane's losing move.


When White attacks at 14, the roles of attacker and defender are reversed in an instant;

now it is the black group that faces a crisis. More than a crisis — it might be more accurate to say that it is already cold. If Black continues with 1 in Dia. 14, White captures him with the brute-force moves of 2 and 4.


Black therefore has no choice but to push down at 15, but after White 16 to 20 it's clear that there's no way to save this group. The outcome of the game has been decided here.

I don't know which specific move Hane overlooked, but apparently he commented after the game, 'I had no sense of danger whatsoever concerning the bottom black group.'


That's why Black played 13, which took away the eye shape of White's centre group for sure. If he had had even the slightest sense of danger, he would probably have blocked at 1 in Dia. 15. Black answers White 2 by going for a trade with 3 to 7. White forces with 8, then invades the bottom right corner with 10. The game becomes a territorial contest once more, and it is indeed close. I can't go so far as to say that the result in this diagram is favourable for Black, but at any rate I can say he had no choice but to block at 1 here. In the game, this stone is at 'a', so after 7 White can easily live by sliding to 9.



Dia. 15: better for Black



Dia. 16: a mistake



Dia. 17: another mistake



Yuki evens the score. Watching the game review is Shiraishi Yutaka 9-dan.

When White plays 20, Black has already, in effect, collapsed. All the same, the contact play of White 24 is an important move, natural though it may be for a pro. If White extends at 1 in *Dia. 16*, Black connects at 2; White can't aim at the cutting point of 'a', so Black lives, and White is the one to collapse. If instead White blocks at 1 in *Dia. 17*, Black lives with 2 and 4. In short, the reason why White 24 in the figure is a tesuji is that, if Black plays 25 at B, White can atari with 25 (if next Black C, then White D).

Hane resigned after White 28. He really lost the game through just one careless move, Black 13, which is an unfortunate way to lose. However, judging by the first two games of the series, he seems to have completely recovered from the slump people were talking about before the match (losing a majority of his games last year, for the first time in his career, and losing the Tengen title).

Yuki, on the other hand, gave the impression of being a little nervous in the first game, but in this game he really seemed at ease.

At any rate, both players were fighting on the edge of a precipice in these two games, which made it really interesting for the spectator. I'm looking forward to the remaining games in the series.

*Black resigns after White 128.
(Monthly Go World, March 2005.)*

Game Three: No compromise

White: Hane Naoki

Black: Yuki Satoshi

Played at the Hotel Heiseikan, Hakodate City, Hokkaido on 2 & 3 February 2005.

Abridged from a commentary by Komatsu Hideki 9-dan. Game report by Chikira Tadashi.




Figure 1 (1–37)

Figure 1 (1–37). Variation on a theme

'I've seen this opening somewhere,' muttered Komatsu Hideki after the moves to 9 were played. After a moment, he dredged it up out of his memory bank: 'It was a game between Cho Hun-hyeon and Chang Hao. I'm sure the players are aware they're following it.' [It was Game 12 in the 3rd Nong Shim Cup, played on 30 January 2002; Chang Hao (W) won by 6½ points.]

After 9, the continuation to 16 is inevitable, and up to this point the game follows the earlier one. Cho played 17 at A, but the players following the game in the pressroom (Komatsu, the Yomiuri commentator, the referee Ishida Yoshio, and O Meien, the satellite-TV commentator) agreed that 17 was better.

When White pincers at 22, the continuation to 30 is a joseki, yet Yuki spent ten minutes on 29. Perhaps he considered cutting at B, but Black will push up at 29 and be satisfied.

Black 31. The usual move is Black 33, after which White 31–Black C–White D follow.

After White presses at 32, Black takes sente with 33 and 35, then switches to 37. The right side is very big, so actually it would have been feasible for White to switch 32 to E there.

Komatsu queried Black 37. 'This move is a mystery to me. I can't see the point of taking up a high position.' White is thick all over the board, so Black E looks better.






Figure 2 (38-61)



Dia. 1: good for White Dia. 2: good for Black

Figure 2 (38-61). Choosing war over peace

Black 39. If Black blocks on the inside with 1 in *Dia. 1*, White flees into the centre with 2 to 6. This result looks slack for Black.


White 40. If at 1 in *Dia. 2*, White can live in the corner up to 7, but Black builds solid outside thickness, so this result is not interesting for White.

White 44. One is usually reluctant to crawl along the second line, but White seems to have little choice. If he seeks life immediately with 1 in *Dia. 3*, he ends up in gote, letting Black switch to A at the bottom in the figure; if White B, he hanes at C, the idea being to make maximum use of his right-side thickness by starting a fight.


White 46. O Meien had an interesting comment. He advocated crawling with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4* before attaching at 5. This way White lives with seven points of territory and can also look forward to peeping at 'a'. After 47 (Black

48 would be slack) in the figure, White can't live in the corner, so he has to cut at 48.

White 56 was the sealed move. In contrast to Games One and Two, the first day of this game had been relatively placid, but the second day made up for that.



Dia. 3: gote



Dia. 4: O Meien's theory

Black 57 starts a fierce fight. The pressroom had been expecting the peaceful sequence of Black D-White E-Black F-White G.

Black 59 and 61 look very good, but when he played 58 Hane must have read out that he could handle these moves.




Figure 3 (62-84)

Figure 3 (62-84). A perilous fight

White is relying on the 62-64 combination. When Black counters with 65 and 67, it begins to look as if the game might be decided here.

The fight develops into a capturing race. White 80 is the only move, but Yuki has prepared a brilliant counter after 84.

Figure 4 (85-100). An enormous ko

Black 85 is a clever move. The players in the

pressroom surmised that Hane might have overlooked it. Asked about this after the game, Hane claimed that he had seen it, but that he had made an elementary misreading in the continuation.





Figure 4 (85-100)



Dia. 5: a better way to fight the ko?

Black 95. The timing of this move may be dubious. Komatsu maintained that Black should have started the ko immediately with 99, that is, 1 in *Dia. 5*, then used 3 as a ko threat. 'With normal play after 5, the position looks like a win for Black,' he claimed.

Figure 5 (101-150). Focus on the centre

When White ends the ko with 14, Black is unable to live at the bottom after 18, so he has to try to use the aji of this group to wall off the outside. Black has his eyes on the white stones at 4 and 10 — if he can swallow them up without

adding a stone locally, he will make a big gain.





Figure 5 (101-150)

ko: 6, 9, 12



Dia. 6: a shinogi contest

Hane had regrets about 26, commenting after the game that he should simply have extended to 1 in *Dia. 6*. Capping at 2 looks best for Black, so White will then stake the game on living with 3 and 5. Komatsu: 'The chances are 50-50.'


The key point in the fighting at the bottom is the question of who gets sente to play first in the centre, that is Black A or White B. White also wants to avoid being forced to remove the captured black group (1 etc.) from the board.

Black 37. Black would get more territory at the bottom if he followed *Dia. 7* (next page).

Black 41 is also dubious: he should block at 1 in *Dia. 8* (next page). White can't omit 2, so Black can capture at 3 in sente, then wall off the centre with 5.


White 48. White would like to switch to the centre, but if he's not careful he will be forced to take the bottom black group off the board, so he

needs to add a stone. However, 48 is a makeshift move; instead, he should follow *Dia. 9*. If Black 2, White 3 gives a close game. Actually, Black might play 2 at 'a', but that leaves White with the severe cut of 'b'.



Dia. 7: better for 37

Dia. 8: better for 41



Dia. 9: a sounder strategy





Figure 6 (151-200)

Figure 6 (151-200). Yuki's fatal mistake in direction

Because of White's dubious move at 48 in the previous figure, Black can play the large endgame moves of 51 and 53 in sente. Having to connect at 54 is painful.



Dia. 10: a win for Black

When Black blocks off the centre with 55, he can expect to win by ten points on the board. Black 57 was played at 5:58 p.m., two minutes before the satellite-TV coverage of the game ended. O Meien summed up the situation by saying: 'The game is probably a win for Black.'

Yuki had started byo-yomi on 57. He ignored White 58, switching to 59. This became the losing move.

Komatsu: 'If Black had used 59 to answer properly with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 10*, he would have won the game. Yuki was worried about the prospect of a white invasion at 4. White aims at an approach-move ko with 8 to 12, but, if Black counters with 13 to 23, White doesn't even get a two-move approach-move ko.'

The game became very close when White reduced Black's centre. After White 88, Ishida commented: 'It smells like a half-pointer.'

White 94. Peeping at White 95 is correct, but even so the game looks like a half-pointer favouring White.




Figure 7 (201-238)

9: retakes

Figure 7 (201–238). Throwing the game away

White 12 is the decisive endgame move. White 16, though natural, is another good move. The margin has widened slightly.

After the game ended at 7:07 p.m., Yuki held his head in his hands. One slip had thrown away a sure win.

Hane: ‘At one point, I thought I’d have to resign. I saw the ko [at the top] . . . I was lucky Black didn’t have enough definite ko threats.’

White wins by 1½ points.

(The Yomiuri Newspaper)

Hane flew home immediately the next day, but Yuki went home in more leisurely fashion. He is a train buff, and he used the Kisei games, each staged in a different city, as a chance to travel on as many different trains as he could. That perhaps also gave him extra motivation to make the series last as long as possible.

The third game was the first to witness an endgame, but the fourth game reverted to form for this series. Ishida Yoshio often comments that the even-numbered games are the crucial ones in a best-of-seven; they decide whether the players remain on a level pegging or whether one pulls ahead.

Game Four: Yuki fights back again

White: Yuki Satoshi

Black: Hane Naoki

Played in Isahaya City, Nagasaki Prefecture on 16 & 17 February 2005.

Abridged from a commentary by Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan. Report by Sano Makoto.






Figure 1 (1–50)



Dia. 1: White satisfied



Dia. 2: also satisfied

Figure 1 (1–50). Hane starts well . . .


White 14. If at A, Black will play 15, forcing White B, then pincer at C. Black 11 may play a role in the ensuing fight, so it may be a little uncomfortable for White. The idea of White 14 is to make miai of A and 16.

White 18 is a probe. If Black answers at 1 in Dia. 1, blocking at 2 works perfectly; if 3, White plays 4 and 6 in sente, then hane at 8. He has made maximum use of the marked stone. If instead Black follows Dia. 2, White is satisfied with 2 and 4.

Black counters by switching to 19, which in turn White ignores to hane at 20. Each player is going his own way.

Black 35 is Hane style: it attacks the two white stones but also has an eye to territory. A more aerial attacking move like 42 or D would also be possible. Yuki thought 86 minutes about his next move, which became the sealed move at the end of the first day.

The players in the pressroom had thought that either 36 or 38 would be the sealed move, but switching to 38 after just one probe in the corner is inconsistent, as the 36–37 exchange may become a minus for White. Yuki admitted after the game that he had changed his mind overnight. At first, he had planned to attach at 1 in Dia. 3. This is not good in itself, as Black can counter with 2 to 6, but the idea is to start a ko with 7 and 9, then use ‘a’ as a ko threat. However, White’s prospects in the ensuing fight are far from clear, which is presumably why Yuki had second thoughts.



Dia. 3: Yuki's original plan

Black attacks in the centre with 39 to 45, then backs up to reinforce with 47. This result looks good for him. When he continues with 49 and 51

(next figure) at the bottom, Black seems to have a lead.





Figure 2 (51-100)
66, 71, 74: ko

Figure 2 (51-100). A lapse in concentration

White 52 was considered a typical Yuki move. The shape move is White A, but 52 puts more pressure on the opponent by filling a liberty.

Black 55 is a slip: there was an oversight in Hane's reading at this point. The correct move is to attach at 61; if White B, Black C is perfect, so White will probably just exchange D for Black E, then switch elsewhere. This would have maintained Black's territorial lead.




Dia. 4: an unfavourable ko

Black 59. Black has no choice; if he pulls back at 1 in *Dia. 4*, White starts a ko with 2 to 4, which is severe.


White 60 is the move that Hane overlooked. This is a tesuji — if Black counters with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5*, White 4 becomes a double atari. Black therefore has no choice but to capture at 61, though this lets White cut off two stones with 62. Black 53 and 55 now look quite forlorn.

Black 69. Black could just flee with 82, but that would be too passive. Black has to play more positively to make up his lost ground, which is why he challenges White to a fight.

White 76. White A is also possible, of course, but, like 52, this move filling in a liberty is Yuki style. The question is whether Black can live after White 82.



Dia. 5: double atari



Dia. 6: living is easy


Actually, for a professional living is easy. The players in the pressroom smoothly laid out the sequence to 7 in *Dia. 6* and commented that this gave Black a reasonable game.

Black goes too far with 83. If White answered at F, Black could get a good shape by attaching at G, but instead White makes a fierce counterattack with 84 and 86. Living now won't be so simple. White 84 looks like an obvious move, but Hane commented that he hadn't considered it. On the face of it, this seems hard to believe, but after the game Hane told me [Sano] that he was still upset about his simple blunder in allowing the cut from 55 on. Perhaps that had made him unnecessarily pessimistic about his position and affected his concentration.


The position looks worrying for Black when White hanes at 86, but Hane shows his class with the brilliancy of Black 87. If White answers at 1 in *Dia. 7*, Black plays 2 to 6. What with the aji of Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c', it won't be easy to kill this group. That means that blocking on the inside at 88 is the only move.

Black 89. Kataoka: 'If Black had discarded his centre group with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 8*, then gone for a trade with 5 and 7 on the side, the game would still have been difficult. Black has the forcing sequence of 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c'—White 'd' in the centre, which makes very effec-

tive use of the 87–88 exchange in the figure. The game will be decided by what happens on the left side and the question of which side gets to play first at the large point of ‘e’.



Dia. 7: unlikely to die



Dia. 8: still a game

However, Hane cut at 89, which meant that he was determined to save this group. Yuki, who had been sitting cross-legged, which is informal and relaxed, switched to sitting on his heels, which is more formal — and more serious. This was the chance he had been waiting for.

The sequence from 90 to 3 in the next figure was played very quickly. Can Black live?

Figure 3 (101–124). A rapid collapse

When Hane extended into the corner with 3, Black still had a faint hope of counterattacking with A, but he already looked resigned to defeat.

White 4 and 6 quickly reduce Black's liberties — the group has no chance of making two eyes. The only remaining hope is to cut on the outside with 15.

White 16. White could safely connect at 17, but he prefers to squeeze with 16 and 18.

If Black continues after 24, 1 and 3 in *Dia. 9*

are the only moves. However, after Black recaptures the ko with 7, White just connects at 8. When this black group is captured, there's no point in continuing.

Black resigns after White 124.

(The Yomiuri Newspaper)





Figure 3 (101–124)

19: connects



Dia. 9: hopeless

4, 7: ko

This was Hane's worst game of the series. It may look as if Black 89 was the losing move, but the real culprit was Black 55. Hane is known for his coolness under pressure, but on this occasion it seems that he let his chagrin at his slip get the better of him. After the game, he commented: 'I lacked patience.' However, full credit has to be given to Yuki, who maintained unrelenting pressure.

Game Five: First win for Black

White: Hane Naoki

Black: Yuki Satoshi

Played in Shima City on 24 & 25 February 2005.

Report by Matsuura Takamoto, based on analysis by Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan, the referee, Yokota Shigeaki 9-dan, the newspaper commentator, and Ishida Yoshio 9-dan, the satellite-TV commentator.





Figure 1 (1-50)



Dia. 1: Yuki's suggestion

Figure 1 (1-50). An enormous moyo

Black 9 is one of Yuki's favourite moves. If White plays 12 at 24, Black will extend to A. White 12 aims at attaching below 3, so Black plays 13.

Black 15. If at 22, a white pincer at B combines well with his position to the left.

Black 21 is a good move: it makes miai of 22 and 23. Black 22 would make 21 an ideal three-space extension from a two-stone wall, so White 22 is natural, but Black 23 is also a good move, on the vital point.


White chooses to move out with 26 to 30, but Black 31 is a superb extension. It's hard to find a

good move for 26. If White just ataries at 27, Black makes good shape with 26; if instead he plays 26 at 28, Black takes a grip on the white stone with an atari to the left of 26, leaving White dissatisfied. White 26 was the best move Hane could come up with, but Yuki had a good suggestion after the game: White 1 in *Dia. 1*. If Black 'a', White hanes at 'b', so Black will just atari at 2; White then plays 3 and 5, getting a result better than in the game and giving Black less thickness to the left.


White's gain from 28 and 30 is that the black group below is weakened. He next attacks its eye shape with 32 — perhaps Hane felt that the 'ordinary' move of C was slack. Black tenukies because answering 32 might make him heavy. He is confident that White can't swallow up all his stones here.

White 42 is consistent with Hane's aggressive approach so far in this series. The 'commonsense' strategy would be to extend patiently at 46 and aim at invading the moyo later; if Black 42, White extends again at D.

White invades at 44, but then goes back to connect at 46, which is, after all, the proper move. If omitted, Black can aim at 1 in *Dia. 2*; he cuts off three white stones, which become a target for attack. Note also that White has to add a move at 'a' in the corner.



Dia. 2: bad for White



Dia. 3: Black can't be sure of winning

Black 47. Black has a chance to wall off his moyo. If he plays the most solid move, 1 in *Dia. 3*, White has the troublesome attachment of 2. The continuation here is one possibility. With the profit White takes on the side, Black may not be confident of winning.




Figure 2 (51-100)


ko: 79, 82, 85, 88, 91; 95: connects (at 56)

Figure 2 (51-100). Yuki takes the lead.


White 52 is aggressive: it's just a little deep. Black 53 was the sealed move.

White goes all out with 54; White A was what most people had predicted. Black creates some aji with the 55-56 exchange, then pushes along with 57. White's hane at 58 is extremely aggressive — the players in the pressroom had researched only the one-space jump to White B and the diagonal move of White 59. In effect, White is getting ready to discard his stone at 52 if he can secure all the bottom area in exchange. However, this does give the impression of being close to an emergency measure.

Black 59 and 61 secure an area of over 80 points. That means that White has to get about 70 points in the area stretching from the bottom to the right. Note that if Black omits 61, White can exploit his bad aji in the centre with 1 in *Dia. 4*; Black can't block at 2 — if he does, disaster follows.



Dia. 4: disaster



Dia. 5: terrible for White

Black sets out to disrupt the bottom area with 63 and 65. The continuation to 73 is a one-way street. With 74, White can't afford to worry about good shape: he fills in a black liberty, but this makes him short of liberties, too. Black gets a tenacious shape with 75 and 77, while White lives with 78. Note that White 1 in *Dia. 5* is not an option for 74: Black links up with 2 to 8 and still has the option of starting a ko with the atari of 'a'.

Black 87. Black has no choice — if he answers at C, White gets forcing moves, beginning with D, so Black gets bad aji in his large territory.

White 90. White could also atari at E; Black would take the ko, and the outcome of the fight would be impossible to predict.

White 92 is a well-timed probe. White then compromises with 94, capturing two stones in good aji and letting Black live by connecting the ko. At this point, Black seems to be about ten points ahead on the board.

Black 99 is a calm move. If instead Black made a hane at F, White would take advantage of his superiority in ko threats to challenge Black to a ko fight with White 99-Black G-White H.



Yuki: just one win away from glory





Figure 3 (101-151)



Dia. 6: Black's bad aji

Figure 3 (101-151). A convincing win for Yuki

White launches another challenge with the sharp attachment of 2, but Black handles it calmly, securing life up to 13. Black seems to have played docilely, letting White play forcing moves at will, but White remains thin at the top and on the right side.

Black 15 is yet another calm move: Black could capture White 14 if he wanted to by playing 1 and 3 in Dia. 6, but he might regret it, as that would give White extra aji to play with. If White next cuts at 4, the continuation to 8 is inevitable; next, White can squeeze in the centre with White 'a' through 'e'. There is no way Black could be confident of killing this white group.

White 26 is Hane's last stab at victory. White has to take all the right side to match Black's

left-side territory.

White 28. Having to defend here is painful, but necessary: Black A is too potent a threat.

Black seeks life with 29 on — the timing of moves such as 29 and 31 is very carefully worked out.


White 40. If at 1 in Dia. 7, Black lives with 2.

White 44. If at 1 in Dia. 8, Black has no trouble living up to 6.


Black lives brilliantly up to 51, and it's all over. Hane apparently made a misreading at some stage in the corner fight, but even so the fight was all Yuki.

White resigns after Black 151.

(Monthly Go World and The Yomiuri Newspaper)



Dia. 7: alive



Dia. 8: alive

For the first time in this series, Black won a game. However, like Games 1, 2 and 4, the game ended after a relatively small number of moves. One possible reason for all the fighting is that both Yuki and Hane tend to be pessimistic about their positions, which means that they are more likely to keep going all-out rather than coast to a win. In one way, this is better than being an optimist, who is likely to slacken off when he thinks he is ahead (how many important games has Yoda lost like this?). However, it may tempt you into unnecessary fights.

Yuki was now just one win away from becoming Kisei, and it must have become apparent to Hane that letting the game be dominated by furious hand-to-hand fighting right from the outset was working to his opponent's advantage.

Hane: 'After the first five games, I realized that Yuki was better than me at fighting.' As the Japanese idiom puts it, this was 'fighting in his opponent's arena'. With his back to the wall, Hane made an important decision: for better or for worse, he would revert to his natural, well-balanced, slow-paced style. Hane's forte is building thickness while taking aim at the opponent's weaknesses.

This decision changed the flow of the match.


Game Six: Hane survives

White: Yuki Satoshi

Black: Hane Naoki

Played at the Kansuiro Inn in Hakone, Kanagawa Prefecture on 9 & 10 March 2005.

Abridged from a commentary by Ryu Shikun 9-dan. Report by Sekine Shingo.



Dia. 3: good for White






Figure 1 (1-50)



Dia. 1: Black is untroubled



Dia. 2: risky for White?

Figure 1 (1-50). Hane reverts to his usual style.

White 20. If White cuts with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1*, Black can easily settle his group by attaching at 4.

White 22 is a compromise — pushing along with 1 in *Dia. 2* would be more in keeping with Yuki's fighting style. According to Ryu, the continuation to 12 is one possibility. His comment: 'This is an extremely difficult fight. If anything, it might be more frightening for White.' White 22 looks like a change in direction. After the game, Yuki lamented: 'If I can't push . . .'

Black 23, 25, and 29 show the change in Hane's strategy in this game. One of the players in the pressroom commented: 'It's hard to believe that Hane is faced with a kadoban.'

For 23, the first move to catch the eye is invading the corner with Black A. Hane commented later that he considered it, but he didn't like the prospect of White's pushing along at B.


Black 25 stores up strength and aims at harassing the centre white group later. Hane: 'Was this move dubious? Black is playing a lot of moves in an area where White is light.' Yuki: 'Not so. This was the move I found most disagreeable.'

White 28. If at C, Black will extend all-out to D, which would not be to White's liking. He expects Black to defend with 32 in response to 28, after which he plans to make the wider extension to E.

Black 29 was the sealed move. As you might expect, it surprised the players in the pressroom. Ryu: 'I didn't predict this. Territorially, it takes zero points, so making effective use of it later will be difficult.' Ryu expected Black 1 in *Dia. 3*; presumably, Hane didn't want White to make himself thick with 2 and 4. If White becomes thick, Black's own thick moves like 23 and 25 lose their meaning, as Black won't be able to harass the centre white group. Locally, however, letting White flatten out the corner with 30 and 32 is painful.

Black 37 is yet another move that stores up strength. In view of Black's solid play, it might be a good idea for White to play more conservatively with 40, as Black's cut at 41 exposes the thinness of White's top group. White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4* (next page) would give a leisurely game. Yuki obviously didn't want Black to get a

chance to defend at 4, but White could be satisfied with 5. According to Ryu, Black might have trouble giving the komi in this variation.



Dia. 4: a leisurely game






Figure 2 (51-100)



Dia. 5: too much for White



Dia. 6: not severe enough

Dia. (51-100). White's error of omission

White 54. Yuki was pessimistic about his position, so instead of investing a move in strengthening his top group he went all out with 54.

White 62 may have gone too far. Takemiya Masaki 9-dan, the referee, commented after the game that surely this should have been at A. Yuki: 'I thought the position was bad whatever I played, so I went all-out.'


The 63-65 combination punishes the overplay. White 66 is natural momentum. If instead White jumps to 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black plays 2 in sente, then makes the severe peep at 4, which makes miai of 'a' and 'b'. Black also aims at 'c' and 'd', so this variation is more than White can handle. However, the cut of 67 is also severe; Black cuts off the centre group from the side, then finally makes his attack on it with 79.

Cutting with 81 to 85 is crude but effective. Ryu: 'This shows good judgement. If instead Black attached at 1 in *Dia. 6*, White would get good potential eye shape after 4, so Black would probably be unable to attack effectively.'

White 86. White should first exchange B for Black C, leaving him with the option of living in the corner. As is seen later, White can't make two eyes here. Yuki presumably hesitated because this loses the aji of cutting at C, but this omission was fatal.

Black 95 is a key point: Black decides not to try to kill the white group at the bottom. If Black plays 1 in *Dia. 7*, the group doesn't have two eyes, but this may be just what White wants. First of all, he plays the large endgame moves of 2 and 4, then cuts with 6 and 8 (if Black 7 at 8, White lives with 'a', which is sente against the corner, and 'b'). White 14 puts Black on the spot — if he pulls out his large group, he will probably lose his stones in the centre.

Black 95 was praised as a calm move typical of Hane. Note that it sets up Black D. Hane probably confirmed to his own satisfaction that 95 would enable him to take the lead.



Dia. 7: trouble for Black





Figure 3 (101-150)



Dia. 8: dead

Dia. 9: bad for Black

Figure 3 (101-150). The game is decided.

Black 7 decides the game: it kills the corner group. At this stage, White 8 is not sente. If instead White played at 1 in *Dia. 8*, Black would kill him with 2 etc., which sets up the five-point large-eye shape.

Answering 12 on the inside at 13 gives Black bad aji. Yuki commented later that if Black had connected at A he intended to resign, but 13 revived his hopes, so he played on.

Black 15. Black could capture the corner group with 1 in *Dia. 9*, but White would play the forcing moves to 6, then set his stone in motion with 8. White 12 will also be sente; he then takes further profit up to 20.

Hane recovers and coolly deals with the problem up to 17. He has lost more than ten points here, but, fortunately for him, his lead before that was big enough to cover it.




Figure 4 (151-201)

Figure 4 (151-201). A satisfying win for Hane

Hane was quite cheerful after this win. His comment: 'In both my previous wins, I was resigned to losing at one point, so in that sense I think I played well in this game.'

Black wins by 6½ points.

(The Yomiuri Newspaper)

Conflicting statistics

There were two contrasting sets of data that became relevant when the series went to the seventh game. One was that the player drawing white did better in the seventh game. The cumulative total was 19 wins to 9 losses for White, a winning percentage of 67.8. Since Yuki got white, this statistic favoured him.

However, there was another statistic that favoured Hane: the record of the player winning the sixth game was 17 wins to 11 losses, a winning percentage of 60.7.

In short, these two statistics canceled each other out. In any case, the players themselves are unlikely to have taken as much interest in this kind of data as the go journalists.

Game Seven: A triumph for Hane

White: Yuki Satoshi

Black: Hane Naoki

Played in the Keidanren Guesthouse in Omachi Town, Shizuoka Prefecture on 16 & 17 March 2005. *Commentary by Yuki Satoshi. Report by Sano Makoto.*






Figure 1 (1-50)
17: connects



Dia. 1: better fighting spirit



Dia. 2: an improvement for White

Figure 1 (1-50). Yuki's regrets

Locally, the sequence from 8 to 21 gives up territory, but when White switches to the pincer of 22, against the background of the thickness he has obtained in compensation, then 'in the

whole-board context, the position is well balanced' (Yuki).

However, Yuki regretted his sealed move of 36. 'Out of fighting spirit, I should have made a shoulder hit at 1 in *Dia. 1*, then played the sequence to 5.' Forcing with 37 to 41 before defending with the diagonal move of 43 showed good judgement on Hane's part.

White 44 is a little unsatisfying: it feels as if White is butting his head against Black's solid position to the right.

White 46. Yuki: 'I wonder if I should have held back one line, that is, played 1 in *Dia. 2*. If Black 2, White crawls up to 9; he can then switch elsewhere if Black plays at 'a'.' If White tries to follow this strategy in the game, he has to crawl one extra time because of 46, so Black's thickness becomes greater.

That's why White plays 48 and 50, but it's undeniable that the result to 60 in the next figure is a little submissive.





Figure 2 (51-81)

Figure 2 (51-81). A missed opportunity and a dubious move


White 68. Initially, Yuki planned to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*, but 'I realized that things go badly for White when he is challenged to a ko with 4 to 8. Black has the ideal ko threat of 10. White must answer at 11, but when Black retakes the ko White has no ko threats. If White extends at 'a', Black connects the ko; White 'b'—Black 'c' is hopeless for White.'

White switches to the jump to 68, so there is no problem. Instead of 72, however, White should go for profit at the bottom with 1 to 5 in

Dia. 4. This would have the extra advantage of making the three marked stones light and would 'give White quite a reasonable game' (Yuki). That perhaps means that Black should simply have blocked at A in the corner instead of peeping at 69. Incidentally, if Black uses 4 in the diagram to block at 'a', White moves out with White 4—Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 'd'—White 'e', which is no good for Black.



*Dia. 3: White can't win the ko
9, 12: ko*



Dia. 4: better for White 72

The conclusion is that White let slip a good opportunity with 72. On the surface, this move looks like the last remaining large point, but actually, in terms of go logic, it's an extension from a solid position and it just prompts Black to build strength with 73 and 75 that he can use to attack White's group at the top, so it's a dubious move.

Figure 3 (82–100). A non-urgent hane

To put it a little severely, Yuki was completely unable to display his real talent in this game. Signs have already been apparent in the previous figure, but this failing becomes really obvious in this and the subsequent figures. He himself commented that 'in the sixth game, insofar as my play was wild and unrestrained, it was at least more typical of me.' [The general opinion among his fellow professionals was that Yuki tensed up in the sixth and seventh games;

getting so close to a big title actually puts a lot of pressure on you. It might be a once-in-a-lifetime chance. Also, it couldn't have helped that Yuki was too keyed up to sleep after the first day's play in the final game.]

The hane of 82 is the move that plays the decisive role in making the flow of this game tough for White. White 82 defends against a placement at 100, but if White has to defend against 83 and 85 with 86 and 88, then 82 is transformed into a non-urgent move.

Yuki: 'I shouldn't have played it . . . I did think that Black probably wouldn't answer it, but I thought that alleviating the threat of an attack on the top white group while putting pressure on the black group made it a big move . . . In a sense, I was also trying to make 72 [in Figure 2] a meaningful move. Even so, White is the one who comes under pressure when Black plays 83 and 85 — there's no question of putting pressure on Black. In the end, if defending with 86 and 88 is necessary, White 82, even if you can't go so far as to call it a pass, doesn't have the full value of one move. I should have settled my group with 1 to 7 in *Dia. 5*. This way it would still have been a difficult game.'






Figure 3 (82–100)



Dia. 5: still an even contest

[Note that Black can't resist with 4 at 7. The fight that follows, shown in *Dia. 6*, is more than he can handle.]



Dia. 6: unreasonable for Black

Black 93 was considered a typically thick Hane move, one that other players might not have thought of. It's hard to find a good move to attack the white group at the top, so Black builds centre thickness up to 99, and passes the buck to the opponent concerning how to continue. This shows good judgement; Yuki commented: 'I would have welcomed an attack on the white group at the top.'

Reviewing the play at this point, Yuki criticized himself: 'If you consider the position, my move at 94 was spineless. I had no choice but to play at 97 even at the risk of death. Black is left with the threat of splitting White into two with Black 96-White 95-Black A, but White would just have to fight his best when the time came. I knew the game was bad for me, but I couldn't judge just how bad it was, so I thought that if I played patiently I might still have a chance.'




Figure 4 (101-150)


Figure 4 (101-150). *The final chance goes begging.*

Yuki: 'I was astonished at Black 3. "What's he up to?" I wondered. Taking up position with Black 7, making miai of Black 3 and surrounding the centre with A, would be good enough. The top white group is weak, so Black would proba-

bly secure quite a big centre.'

Hane: 'I knew that 7 instead of 3 would also keep the lead, but enclosing the centre involves some degree of uncertainty. "That's not my style," I thought. I would be left with regrets if I played that way and by some chance lost the game.'

White attaches at 6, poking his head out while reducing the centre, then exposes the weakness of the bottom right black group by crawling at 10: it was at this moment that a faint ray of light appeared for White in the midst of his misery — only to be extinguished by White 16. This let slip White's last chance, so in effect it is the losing move.



Dia. 7: White's last chance

If instead White rammed into Black with 1 in *Dia. 7*, then played 3 and 5, forcing Black 6 (to forestall White 6-Black 'a'-White 'b'), he could then switch to the largest point, which is 7. You can't go so far as to say the game is good for White, but it would punish Black's overplay at 3 in the figure, and make the game a real contest.

Yuki: 'I chose 16 in the figure after a lot of agonizing. I was quite aware of *Dia. 7*, but I believed the move in the game also made a contest of it.'

Black 19 is the decisive point. After this, White doesn't get any further chances.

Figure 5 (151-200), Figure 6 (201-262)

In these figures, Hane winds up the game while single-mindedly focussing on safety-first moves. He reaches his goal with a surprisingly large margin of 11 points on the board.

Hane had completed his first defence of the Kisei title. Considering how Yuki had dominated the first five games, you have to give Hane credit for his mental toughness and fighting strength.

From Yuki's point of view, this defeat will leave him full of regrets — not because he lost the last two games, but because he was unable to play his own go. The pressure of needing just one more win, of being so close, was too heavy a

burden. In contrast, Hane was able to revert to his natural style, just because he was faced with a kadoban.

When asked what he had gained from this experience, Yuki, after some thought, replied: 'I realized that two-day games are not just a matter




Figure 5 (151–200)
69: connects (at 60)
75, 74, 76




Figure 6 (201–262)

33: connects (at 28); 62: connects (left of 60)

of technique; everything you have goes into them.'

Black wins by 4½ points.

(Monthly Go World, May 2005. Kisei report translated by John Power.)



Yuki is interviewed after the players have concluded the game review and put away the stones.

The 60th Honinbo Title: Takao Shinji vs. Cho U

There was quite a difference in the status of the contenders in the 60th Honinbo title match. Cho U had established himself as the top player when he annexed the Meijin title in 2004 to go with his Honinbo and Oza titles and he had added to his lustre in 2005 by winning an international title, the LG Cup. He was also the current holder of the NHK and NEC Cups and during the course of this match he also won the TV Asia Cup, so he had seven titles to his name.

Although two years older, Takao had lagged behind. He had won six minor titles, but to date he had made only one unsuccessful challenge for a top-seven title. That was the Judan title in 2003, when he lost 2–3 to O Rissei. A few years ago, he was often bracketed with Cho U, Hane Naoki, and Yamashita Keigo as a potential star of the future, but he was the only one still to win a major title. That doesn't mean that he had fallen behind in go strength, however; every year he was at or near the top of the prize list for most wins. It was considered just a matter of time before he joined the ranks of the titleholders.

Even so, no one predicted how the match with Cho U would go.

Game One: A successful debut

White: Takao Shinji 8-dan

Black: Cho U Honinbo

Komi: 6½; time: 8 hours each

Played at the Dazaifu Tenmangu Shrine, Dazaifu City, Fukuoka Prefecture on 9 & 10 May 2005.

Abridged from a round-table commentary by Komatsu Hideki 9-dan, Omori Yasushi 8-dan, and Sakai Hideyuki 7-dan

Figure 1 (1–50). A bold invasion

There are two surprises in this figure, one minor and one major.

First of all, the textbooks all say you should play 19 before 17. The same shape results with Black 19–White 20–Black 17–White 18, but the difference is that in the game White is given the option of pushing up with 18 at 19. Since White declines to do this, changing the order doesn't change the result.

White builds an excellent moyo up to 42. Amateur and professional alike were astonished by Cho's next move, the deep invasion of 43.

Since it is Cho, known for his accuracy at positional judgement, making this move, we can assume that Black loses if he doesn't come in this far.




Figure 1 (1–50)

Black 49 is essential. If instead Black simply extends at 50, White will seal him in with White 49–Black A–White B and most likely kill him.




Figure 2 (51–100)

Figure 2 (51–100). Takao's overplay

Black 61. Black doesn't want to move out above 59 because that will give White a chance to make a leaning attack on Black's group on the top left side.

Black manages to pull out his group up to 69, but that doesn't mean that White is doing badly. In fact, he has the lead in territory. However, White's next move, the pressing move of 70, is an overplay. Takao didn't realize that Black would be able to cut him in sente with 77 to 81.

When Black pokes his head out with 89, his invasion at 43 in Figure 1 has been a success, and he has the lead. Instead of 70, White should simply have made a diagonal connection at 82; if Black jumped out at 74, White could continue the fight by capping at 99. That should give him a chance to make an invasion at the top.

White 90 and 92 are a desperation measure, but giving Black the ponnuki can't be good. At this point, the professionals in the pressroom were predicting an early end to the game. Otake Hideo commented: 'The game will be over in 30 minutes.' All Black has to do is to save his centre group.




Figure 3 (101-150)


Figure 3 (101-150). Cho slips up.

There's a qualification to the final sentence above: if Black suffers serious damage to another position in the process of saving his centre group, the game won't be good for him.


Black 3 is too aggressive: it gives White the chance to engineer a double attack. If Black kept things simple with 1 in *Dia. 1*, there would be no problem. If White 2 etc., White eventually has to come back to link up with 12, so Black in turn either links up with 13 or makes an eye on the side.

Black 7 represents Black's last chance to win the game. Once again, the correct move is 1 in *Dia. 2*. If White 2, Black cuts at 3, creating the

dual threats of 'a' and 'b'. If White plays 2 as in *Dia. 3*, Black defends the corner solidly with 3. If White 4, Black counters with 5 to 13. Black is threatening to cut off a group with 'a', so White must counter with 14 and 16, but Black captures four stones with 17.



Dia. 1: keeping things simple



Dia. 2: the last chance Dia. 3: good for Black

Black's centre group is safe after 11; the problem is that Black has given White the very effective cut of 12. The three-stone sacrifice sets up the sente cut of 16 and the squeeze to 24. In combination with 22 and 26, this greatly weakens Black's centre top position, which formerly had been so strong, thanks to the ponnuki. Compare this to the position at the top at the end of Figure 2 — there has been a transformation.

White 12 decides the game. Cho fights on tenaciously, but even his endgame skill is not up to this challenge.




Figure 4 (151-200)

ko (over 53): 56, 59, 62, 71, 74, 77; 81: connects (right of 53); 82: ko (at 64); 85: ko (at 63)




Figure 5 (201-232)

ko (over 1): 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 25, 28



Winning with white against Cho U: Takao could hardly ask for a better start to his challenge.

Figure 4 (151-200), Figure 5 (201-232)

Black resigns after White 232.
(Monthly Go World, July 2005)

Game Two: A story of four kos

White: Cho U

Black: Takao Shinji

Played in Hawai Hot Spring, Yurihama Town, Tottori Prefecture on 26, 27 May 2005.

Report by Inoue Yuji.






Figure 1 (1-50)



Dia. 1: ladder



Dia. 2: White is thick


Figure 1 (1-50). Each goes his own way.

White 8 is unusual, but Cho has played it a number of times. If Black answers at 1 in *Dia. 1*, White will confine him to the side with 2 etc. If he plays at 1 in *Dia. 2*, the sequence to 9 is

likely. Black A is also possible, but the variations are too numerous to give diagrams.

Takao's response is none of the above: *ten-uki*. But note that 9 breaks the ladder in *Dia. 1*, so White 10 is natural.


Each player goes his own way with 11 to 13. After 12 and 14 at the top, the black stone still has *aji*. For example, Black could live with 1 etc. in *Dia. 3*, but this hurts his marked stone while making the marked white stone look good.



Dia. 3: good for White

Black 29 is natural momentum. Usually Black would just draw back at 36, but then White would exchange B for Black 45, forestalling Black C, then capture the two black stones with 30 or 43.

White simply blocks at 30, which leaves Black the option of C. If Black does play 1 in *Dia. 4*, White plans to challenge him to a ko fight with 8. He has a perfect ko threat at 10, but, after Black plays 'a' and White recaptures the ko, Black has no ko threat to match White 'b'. Instead of 5 —



Dia. 4: good for White *Dia. 5: White satisfied*
9: ko

Dia. 5. Black could link up with 1 etc., but after 7 White seems to get a reasonable game with White 'a' through 'e'.

Cho surprised the players in the pressroom by playing just one more move here — Black 31, which alleviates the severity of White 36 — then switching to 33. White 34 is also surprising. 'An amateur would be scolded if he played this,' someone commented. It's bad shape [as it leaves the weak point of D], but at least it prevents Black from sliding to E.

White 46 stop Black 46—White C—Black F.




Figure 2 (51–103)

ko (over 59): 62, 65, 68, 71;
73: connects (at 54); 85: connects (at 56)


Figure 2 (51–103). *The first two kos*

White 56 etc. Fighting this ko is apparently natural for professionals.

Black 67. The sealed move.

Black 73. Black finishes off the ko, as he figures White will get too many ko threats if he answers 72.

Up to 85, Black cuts off the three centre white stones, making him thick. Takao was probably satisfied with his position, as he is usually fond of thickness. However, Cho was probably happy with having transformed the top left corner into white territory; he also got to play 86, eliminating the *aji* of *Dia. 3*, which was the largest point on the board.



Dia. 6: bad for White *Dia. 7: better for 103*

Yet another ko fight starts with Black 87. If White uses 88 to connect at 1 in *Dia. 6*, he loses the capturing race after 8.

Black 91. Black settles the shape here before fighting the ko on the top left. However, the more uncompromising moves in *Dia. 7* would have been better for 103.




Figure 3 (104-150)

ko (over 5): 8, 11, 14, 17, 20; 22: connects (at 5)





Figure 4 (151-200)

ko (over 69): 75, 78, 81, 84, 87, 90, 93, 96, 99



Dia. 8: bad for White

Figure 3 (104-150). A close game

At the start of this figure, Black seems to be a shade ahead.

Black 7. Counterattacking with A looks feasible; the fact that Black doesn't do so would indicate he is confident in his position.

White 10. If White connects at 1 in Dia. 8, Black 2 to 6 put him on the spot. Next, 'a' and 'b' are miai for Black.

In the end, Black cedes this ko to White in exchange for successive moves in the centre at 21 and 25. This is good enough for Black, but nonetheless the game is very close.

White 32 is a tesuji. If instead White plays at 34, Black gets sente and switches to B. If White wedges in at 32 later on, Black will answer at C.

Figure 4 (151-200). The third major ko

Black 53. If at 54, there's no telling who will win.

Yet another ko starts with White 74.

Black 85 is a point-losing ko threat, as it fills in a black liberty.






Figure 5 (201-250)

ko: 7, 10; 12: connects (left of 4); 20: ko (above 17); ko (over 33): 36, 39, 42, 47, 50



Dia. 9: Black collapses



Dia. 10: a closer game

Figure 5 (201–250). The fourth ko fight

Black 9. If Black ends the ko with 1 in *Dia. 9*, he collapses after 2 to 10.

White 12. White wins this ko, too. He is denying Black a chance to clinch the game.

White 26. The game would have been closer if White had followed *Dia. 10*; he resists Black 'a' later with 'b'.

White 32 starts the fourth major ko fight. Cho went into byo-yomi on this move.

Black 55. This cut means that White has suffered a large loss. It decides the game.




Figure 6 (251–315)

95: connects (below 91); 108: captures (at 72);
109: blocks (below 72); 113: ko (at 107);
115: connects (at 72)

Figure 6 (251–315). Profiting from a ko fight

Cho U is renowned for his skill at ko. That doesn't necessarily mean winning the ko as such but rather gaining from the ko fight. In this game, however, it was Takao who rode the four ko fights to victory.

Incidentally, this is the first time Cho U has lost the first two games of a top-seven title match (out of the ten he has played).

Black wins by 4½ points.

(Monthly Go World, July 2005)

Game Three

Two placements lead to victory

White: Takao Shinji

Black: Cho U

Played at Meiji Village, Inuyama City, Aichi Prefecture on 8 & 9 June 2005.

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko 9-dan. Report by Konishi Taizo 8-dan.






Figure 1 (1–20)



Dia. 1: standard joseki



Dia. 2: a new idea

Figure 1 (1–20). Shuko's new proposal

Black 9 is a probe, played to see what White does on the top left before deciding Black's strategy on the bottom left. The ordinary joseki is 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1*, but then White has the strong extension of 4, which aims at an invasion and makes reinforcing with Black 'a' urgent. When

White plays 10 and Black extends to 13, the invasion is not such a threat, as 10 is farther away. If White does something different with 10, Black can also change the way he plays at the bottom.

The above is the standard theory. However, Fujisawa Shuko had a fresh comment about 13. 'Since White has a solid position at the top, Black could consider holding back to 1 in *Dia.* 2.' Black 1 is certainly solid — if White 'a', Black has no problems after 'b'. In short, Black has no weaknesses.





Figure 2 (21-60)
43: connects (at 38)



Dia. 3: right direction of play

Figure 2 (21-60). A hectic fight


The sequence in the top right corner is a joseki. The tight move of Black 23, forestalling White A, has been popular recently. The solid answer of 24, which is the proper move, is Takao style.

Black 25. Shuko: 'Defending with Black 1 in *Dia.* 3 is probably the right direction of play.' If White invades the top with 'a', Black counters with 'b', making the game hectic. That is why Black plays the high, aggressive move of 1,


rather than 'c', which locally is the shape move. Takao planned to play at White 2. White 26 in the game is, of course, much sharper; it starts a skirmish.

Black 35 is a tesuji. Shuko: 'Black will be happy if he can take away the opponent's eye shape and secure his own base, but . . . ' Black's ideal result would be White 38-Black 36, but White is hardly going to allow this. The fight now becomes fiercer.


Shuko: 'The leisurely move for 35 is 1 in *Dia.* 4, but after 2 to 6 White 'a' later will be a good point for attack and defence.'



Dia. 4: leisurely



Dia. 5: feasible for White



Dia. 6: a big difference


Black 37. If Black pulls back at 1 in *Dia.* 5, the moves to 22 are one possible continuation. Shuko: 'In this sequence, White plays lightly with 18 and 22. In the capturing race at the top, White has a tenacious shape, so it will take a long time for the fight to be resolved. For that reason, it's feasible for White.'

The moves from 38 to 43 are inevitable. If White plays 40 at B, Black 40 will split him into two, giving him a certain loss.

White 44 is a mistake. Takao: 'White must play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6* to create defects in Black's shape.' This is a big difference from the solid, board-like connection of 45. This carelessness is unlike Takao. Up to 50, White gets a heavy group. Black's attack has succeeded.

Cho was probably happy with his position when he played at 53. Note that the preceding move at 51 was essential. If Black omits it, hastening to play 1 in *Dia. 7*, White can hane at 2, as he wins the fight after 8. Black 7 at 'a' is unreasonable: White 7.

Shuko: 'White 54 misses the vital point. White 1 in *Dia. 8* is the only move.' White 1 captures just one stone, Black gets a good forcing move at 2, and the life of the group is not yet guaranteed. Few players would look at this move. Shuko: 'Getting an eye is big; White has the forcing move of 'a', the aji of 'b', and the sente move of 'c'. He's thick.' Shuko's advocacy of this variation probably reflects his unique feel for thickness.



Dia. 7: Black collapses *Dia. 8: thickness*

Figure 3 (61-87). A surprising placement

The game looks like smooth sailing for Black when he pokes his head out with 57 in Figure 2 and gets to switch to 61 at the top. In contrast, Takao focusses on the preservation of his group with 74. Again, this deliberate pace is the feature of Takao's play.

Black 75. This cut prevents White from playing A in sente.

White 78 was the sealed move. Shuko: 'Black has more secure territory. My judgement is that Takao is a little behind.' However, the sealed move took Cho by surprise.

The usual invasion is White 1 in *Dia. 9*. However, 2 will enable Black to reduce White's corner quite a bit later, so White doesn't actually accomplish very much. White 'a' and Black 'b' next will just simplify the position and hasten White's defeat.






Figure 3 (61-87)



Dia. 9: nothing special *Dia. 10: good for White*



Dia. 11: good for White

Shuko: 'On this occasion, White 78 is a sharp move. If Black counters with 2 in *Dia. 10*, White will split him into two, so Black will face a tough fight. If instead Black plays 2 in *Dia. 11*, White eats up the territory on the side, so this is slack for Black.'

That means that Black has no choice but to switch to 79 etc. This is in keeping with Cho's territory-oriented style. The side positions are transformed.




Figure 4 (88-110)

Figure 4 (88-110). The second placement

Shuko: 'White 88 to 94, sealing Black in in gote but with good aji, is typical of Takao's thick style. Needless to say, he is reinforcing against the next ko fight he is aiming at.'

Black 97. If Black gets a stone at 109, he can cut at A, so 97 is a tight move, but . . . Shuko: 'This move tends to focus too much on profit. Instead of peeping at 95, the standard strategy here would be to peep at B, then move out with C.' The logic is that playing on top makes you stronger in a battle or in a ko fight.

White rolls out his second placement with 98, which has three aims: dancing out with 110, attaching at D, and linking up with 100. This move was probably not included in Cho's hypotheses. After 100, the position is tricky.

The two carefully planned placements have regained the initiative for Takao.

Shuko: 'This is the first time I've seen the placement of 78 [in Figure 3]. When I asked Shinji if he had planned it in advance, he said he'd seen it in a Cho Hun-hyeon game. He's studying more than I thought.'

From Cho's point of view, he had probably counted on a certain amount of territory on the left side and at the top, so he must have been most upset when this territory not only disappeared but even the lives of his groups were threatened. Nothing on the second day of the game was going his way, and he might even have been getting a little irritable.

Black sets up a ko at the top with 105 to 108, then leaves it as it is, switching to 109. With its follow-up of E, this is quite big; Black is also

hoping for a chance, if things work out the right way, to steal the eye shape of the large white group above and stage an upset.

Shuko: 'Black 109 is too impatient; it's probably the losing move. Black had no choice but to play patiently, defending at the top by blocking at F.'

With 110, White sets out in earnest to capture this black group — Black is in trouble. Usually you would have no problem saving a group if you had a ko, but the disparity in ko threats is out of Black's control.




Figure 5 (111-165)

ko (over 13): 16, 21, 24, 27, 30, 37, 40, 43;
49: connects (below 13)

Figure 5 (111-165). Takao's strength in ko fights

Once, when I [Konishi] was getting a commentary on a Takao game from Komatsu Hideki 9-dan, who is a good friend of his and a fellow member of his study group, he made an interesting comment. 'I've often fought a ko with Takao, but I've never ended up happy.' This indicates that Takao plays thickly, choosing the proper moves, so he always has more ko threats than the opponent. Of course, Cho is known for his skill at fighting kos, and in many games he's got out of a tight spot by resorting to a ko. However, that's not working with his present opponent.

White shrewdly forces with 14 and keeps the pressure up with 20 and 26. Every move hits the spot, and he finishes off the ko fight by seizing the right side with 52. This decides the game. Cho, too, has failed to find happiness in a ko fight with Takao.





Figure 6 (166-202)



Dia. 12: keeping the game simple

Figure 6 (166-202). Missing the simple path to victory

Black is way behind, but he hasn't given up. In fact, he's aiming at staging an upset.

The only remaining open space is at the bottom. Naturally, Cho goes all out there. The confusing thing for Takao is that he can probably see many lines to victory. As it happens, he chooses a bad one.

Shuko: 'White 82 is a bad move. The bottom group may have lived, but Black seals him in with good aji up to 95, setting the stage for the problem move of 99. Instead of 82, playing 1 to 9 in *Dia. 12* would have settled the game.'


Black 99 brings on a potential crisis. Takao regains his composure and compromises with 102, so nothing untoward happens.

Shuko: 'If White answers 99 with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 13*, it may look safe, but Black has prepared the devilish move of 4. Black 6 is sente, so Black can cut with 10 and 12. The large group suddenly expires.' Instead of 5 —


Even if White dodges to 1 in *Dia. 14*, Black 2 exploits his shortage of liberties to cut at 4.

The wrong answer to 99 would have triggered an upset. White is lucky that he keeps his


lead even when Black cuts at 11 in the next figure.



Dia. 13: an upset



Dia. 14: White loses



Dia. 15: doesn't work




Figure 7 (203-262)

47: ko (below 44); 49: connects (right of 21); ko (over 44): 50, 53, 56, 59, 62

Figure 7 (203-262). Treading on thin ice

Black 11. If Black weren't satisfied with this and wanted more, what would happen? If instead

he plays 1 and 3 in *Dia. 15* (previous page), White plays 4 to 10, setting up either a snapback or a capture, so he is safe.


When Black resigns, he is behind by the komi.

Takao managed to avoid a major pitfall. He now had a 3-0 move; it's safe to say he never dared to dream of this before the match started.

Black resigns after White 262.

(Monthly Go World, August 2005)

Takao and Fujisawa Shuko



Takao is a disciple of Fujisawa Shuko, but his talent was first discovered by Taoka Keiichi, a strong amateur who was a scenario writer and also a go writer. In his later years, he had a flair for discovering children with go talent. His three leading finds were Mimura Tomoyasu, Morita Michihiro, and Takao Shinji.

One day, he came to visit Shuko, an old friend, bringing with him game records of these three, who were all inseis at the time. Konishi Taizo, who was present, tells the story.

After having Shuko review the game records, Taoka said: 'The three of them should soon make shodan. Would you take them on as disciples?'

'Why not leave them as your disciples? Everyone in the go world knows you, so there would be no problem.'

'Actually, I have malignant cancer. I don't have much time left.'

After a pause — 'I understand. Say no more.'

That's how Shuko, who took hardly any disciples, suddenly acquired three.

In an interview after he won the Honinbo title, Takao said that he regularly consulted Shuko about his games, especially about problems he couldn't solve by himself. He added that

on occasion he had pursued Shuko to the race-track to get his opinion.

Game Four: Not without a fight

White: Cho U

Black: Takao Shinji

Played at the Sapporo Park Hotel on 20 & 21 June 2005.

Abridged from a round-table discussion by Komatsu Hideki 9-dan, Ishida Akira 9-dan, and Yo Kagen 9-dan. Report by Matsuura Takamoto.




Figure 1 (1-35)

Figure 1 (1-35). *A bold pushing strategy*

Ishida Akira: If White 2 and 6 and Black 5 and 7 were all one line lower, this would be a joseki. . . .

Komatsu Hideki: Cho's strategy with 10 etc. really made me happy.

Yo Kagen: He played quickly, too. 'Pushing is the only shape here,' he commented later.

IA: Instead of 10, we would first of all consider the knight's move of A. Black would make good shape with B, but White could switch to C.

KH: I saw these pushing moves on satellite TV. I was a bit worried: Cho is usually cautious, yet here he was playing so boldly.

IA: He's certainly bold. Even so, it's not good. This is pushing the cart from behind. I consider it very dubious.

Matsuura Takamoto: Was it necessary to push six times? What about White 14 at D?

YK: That leaves Black with the vital point of E, so it's probably no good. White will be subjected to a one-sided attack.

KH: The same thing applies to White 16 at F: Black plays at G. And to White 18 at H: Black I. Once you push at 10, you probably have no choice but to keep pushing to 20.

MT: Black also doesn't choose to hane until 21.

YK: If he hanes, White will cut immediately. Making the hane before 21 will probably land Black in a tough fight.

IA: If White plays 24 at J, Black K, with the backing of his six-stone wall, will be severe. . . . Black 27 is a good move.

KH: The game seems easier for Black than for White after 31.

IA: What astonishes me is that White doesn't use his magnificent wall to invade the right side. If White L, the moves through to White P are probable. Could he be dissatisfied with this?

YK: White's territory is big. But perhaps this is not Cho's style.

KH: I maintain that Black should hold back at Q instead of 35.

IA: I know how you feel. Out of respect for White's wall, Black should make an extension rather than a pincer. If White invaded at R, Black could make a two-space extension to S.





Figure 2 (36-67)



Dia. 1: bad for Black

Dia. 2: Black loses

Dia. 2) 8: throws in; 9: captures; 11: connects

Figure 2 (36-67). A hectic fight

KH: For once, let me ask Matsuura a question. Why doesn't Takao play the orthodox taisei joseki instead of 45?

MT: After 1 to 3 in *Dia. 1*, sliding to White 10 is the joseki. Black plays 6, and there seem to be no problems.

IA: But there are. White will poke his head out with 4; if Black 5, White hanes at 6.

MT: Next, Black 7 and 9?

KH: White calmly connects at 10. The ladder after White 'a' doesn't work because of the white wall lying in wait in the centre. If Black pulls out his four stones, he will be in for a hard time of it.

MT: Instead of 9, how about 1 in *Dia. 2*? . . . Uh, oh. White squeezes?

YK: Right. White counters with the tombstone squeeze [the two-stone sacrifice]. He wins the capturing race with the diagonal tesuji of 16.


MT: I must remember White 4 [in *Dia. 1*] for when the ladder is good.

KH: Starting with the cut of 49, both sides make a series of ataris to try to gain momentum. The sequence to 61 is instructive.

IA: I have my doubts about White 62. I was taught that in positions like this you should atari at 1 in *Dia. 3*.

KH: Black 2 looks like the most reasonable answer. After 3, Black can't really omit 4.

YK: This is much better for White than the game. With the backing of his thickness, White could invade the right side immediately.




Dia. 3: better for White

IA: Black can't resist. If he connects at 2 in *Dia. 4* (next page), the diagonal connection of 3 is just right.

YK: Ah, I see. If Black 4, White can connect at the base with 5. After 7, this white group can't be captured.

MT: If Black 'a', White cuts at 'b'.

KH: If Black 4 at 7, White goes on a rampage at the top. I feel sure Cho missed this move [White 5].



Dia. 4: good for White





Figure 3 (68-100)



Dia. 5: unloseable for Black?

Figure 3 (68-100). Cho's brilliancy

KH: White invades at 72 with the backing of his thickness, but Black has his corner enclosure and allies at the centre top, so he can easily handle the fight. Actually, when he jumps to 73, the fight is easier for him than for White. . . . White sets out to make shape with 78. Black 79 and White 80 are natural. With 81, Takao makes a mistake in judgement that could be called a cause of his defeat.


MT: It looks like the shape move.

IA: Attaching at 82 gives Black a jolt — White breaks into the top area. Instead of 81, linking up with 1 in *Dia. 5* is the only move.

This turns the top and the top right into secure territory. I think the game would be unloseable for Black. What do you think?

KH: I agree. If White 2, Black can then play 3. I wonder if Takao hallucinated about something.

YK: Apparently he didn't want to have his shape spoiled. But his worries were needless. If White plays 2 and 4 in *Dia. 6*, then hanes at 6, the position is out of White's control after 7. In other words, White doesn't have time to spoil Black's shape.



Dia. 6: a needless worry


KH: White 98 is a brilliant move. Have a good look at it. It does look like the so-called duffer's diagonal move, but it's the move that clinches the game.

MT: Let me just sort things out. At present, White is groping for a way to settle his group. The question is how effectively Black can attack it.

IA: Recall the shape we started with! When White invaded at 72, Black had good prospects of making a fair bit of territory in the area from the top right corner along the top. He's now been reduced to just the corner. He's got to kill the white group or come close to pull off an upset.

YK: Cho said that at first he planned to use 98 to follow *Dia. 7*. But Black 2 is the vital point. Cho says he realized that the game was not good for him when Black got a large area on the side after 4.

KH: What? He just happened to think of 98? Well, luck is part of one's strength.



Dia. 7: good for Black





Figure 4 (101-154)

ko (over 27): 30, 33, 36; 40: ko (at 16); 43: ko (at 37); 46: ko (at 16)



Dia. 8: tricked

Dia. 9: Black doesn't profit

Figure 4 (101-154). White takes the lead.

IA: Black has just blocked White's escape route when he cuts at 4. This gives Black a severe jolt. It's also an ally for the wall made from White's six pushing moves in the opening.

YK: Black may be able to save his centre stones with 5 and 7, but he loses his side connection with A after White 8. The moves to 14 are a one-way street. White has managed to rescue his top and bottom groups simultaneously.

IA: The result is that Black's stone at 9 becomes superfluous. That's what really hurts. . . . White has made a big profit compared to the original shape.

KH: Still, Takao is surprisingly tenacious. From his personality, you'd expect him to resign after White links up on the right side. I'm not exaggerating: this is the first time I've seen Takao play like this.

MT: The issue has been decided. Thank you for your time.

IA: Eh? You want to finish up? There are still lots of difficult points.

YK: I have a question. Instead of 36, wouldn't you want to atari at 1 in Dia. 8?

MT: Now you mention it . . . White looks like capturing four stones after 5.

KH: You fell for it again. What happens if you atari with 6 and 8?

MT: Oh! White can't connect! Shortage of liberties is frightening.

KH: There are two more noteworthy points. One comes up with 53. If Black plays at 1 in Dia. 9, he can capture 11 stones [not all shown in the diagram].

IA: But, of course, this doesn't cause an upset. White makes a ponnuki with 2, then pushes through in sente with 4. His bottom area swells up when he captures this stone. White wins by a big margin.





Figure 5 (155-218)

ko (over 55): 60, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84; 86: connects (at 55); 100: connects (below 98)

Figure 5 (155-218). Cho finally picks up a win.

YK: The last interesting point is White 112. This reinforcement is absolutely necessary. If White switches elsewhere, for example, 1 in Dia. 10 (next page), Black easily pulls off something in the corner with 2.

KH: The life and death of the white group on the side is involved. If Black plays at 'a', White must answer at 'b'. In short, Black 'c' is sente, so, if White plays at 'd' after 3 and 4, Black gets a ko with 'e'—White 'f'—Black 'g'. If instead Black plays 4 at 'f', he collapses after Black 'd'.



Dia. 10: trouble in the corner

YK: There have been a lot of kos in this series.

KH: Certainly. Cho likes ko, and Takao's style makes him strong at ko. By the way [to the reader], you won't improve so long as you dislike ko.

*Black resigns after White 218.
(Monthly Go World, August 2005)*

Game Five: An endgame victory

White: Takao Shinji

Black: Cho U

Played at Miyama Hot Spring, Chichibu City, Saitama Prefecture on 27 & 28 June 2005.

Commentary by Takao Shinji. Report by Akiyama Kenji.





Figure 1 (1-50) 40: connects (above 36)



Dia. 1: a difference in style


Figure 1 (1-50). Avoiding submissive play

I wouldn't say I had prepared a strategy, but I had thought a little about the fuseki, so I was surprised by Black 3. After all, Cho often plays at 5 immediately. However, Kobayashi Izumi [Cho's wife] had played 3 and 5 the week before, so I shouldn't have been surprised.

White 10 could be called my strategy. Simply cutting at 12 is also possible, of course.

Black 11 is where differences in style come out. I would play 1 in *Dia. 1*, wait for White 2, then extend at 3. I don't know which is better.

The moves to 16 proceeded as I had hypothesized, but Black 17 jolted me like a severe earthquake. The game moved into an unknown realm.




Dia. 2: submissive

White 18. White 1 in *Dia. 2* feels a little submissive. Black will probably play 2 to 6. If 7

to 9 follow, this would be a reasonable game.

I thought that the position was reasonable even if I gave Black the tesuji of 21 and 23. But I didn't see Black 29 coming.

Forcing with Black 29 to 33 is natural. Not having read this was slack on my part. If Black plays 1 in *Dia. 3*, White 2 to 4 follow. White would be grateful, but go was not meant to be this easy.




Dia. 3: too much to expect

White 36. Capturing with 1 and 3, letting Black play 2 to 6, in *Dia. 4* would be awfully submissive. There's no way you could hope to win by playing like this.

The sequence to 46 is more or less a one-way street. The conclusion Cho and I arrived at in the post-game review with Kono Rin was that the result was perhaps a little unfavourable for White. But apparently Fujisawa Shuko thought that it was not bad for White.

Black 47. Personally, I would take up position with Black 48, making White jump to 47, then continue with Black A. I imagine that this, too, is a difference in style.



Dia. 4: too submissive

Dia. 5: not good





Figure 2 (51-80)



Dia. 6: an indiscretion

Figure 2 (51-80). Should Black push through?

Black attacks with 51 and 53, but White is unworried, as he has the peep of 54.

Black 55. I heard that on satellite TV O Meien strongly advocated pushing through with 1 in *Dia. 5*. We also reviewed this variation, but we didn't get a good result for Black. To give one example, White has the tenacious attachment of 2. Black may steal his eye shape with 3 to 7, but after 8 Black has to reinforce on the outside with 9; after 10 and 12, Black is the one in trouble. If he ataries on the first line, White of course fights a ko. Black's eye shape is shaky, as White has 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c'.

Black also has chances to push through at 64 with 61 and 63, but whether it's good or not is a separate issue. Even so, up to 65 White has forced Black to play a little submissively. That being so, I can only feel awe for Fujisawa Sensei's insight in saying that the result to 46 is not bad for White. Even now, I often learn from him, and he points out things I don't notice.

Instead of 78, I almost did something risky. At first, I was planning to atari at 1 in *Dia. 6*.

However, it's questionable if White is alive after Black 2 and 4. The group probably won't die, thanks to the forcing move of White 'a', but this is not a variation to play out of choice.





Figure 3 (81-100)
97: ko (at 89); 100: ko (at 94)



Dia. 7: disaster

Figure 3 (81-100). More territory than Cho!

The fighting comes to a pause when White lives with 82. Black 83 again shows the difference in our styles. Black's shape is precarious, so I would link up solidly with Black A.

What happens if Black omits 85? I didn't see it, but after the game Cho showed me the combination of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 7*. Black collapses.

White 86. I was surprised to realize that for once I had more territory than Cho. However, White had some thin positions, so I couldn't relax.

Black 87 is a good move. White answers respectfully with 88 — with the centre group to look after, he can't start a fight here. Cho said later that around this point he felt the game was a little difficult for him. So, he starts one of the ko fights that are his forte with 89 to 93.





Figure 4 (101-150)
28: ko (above 9); 31: ko (at 9)



Dia. 8: not good for Black

Figure 4 (101-150). Erratic play by both

Black 1 is a nasty point for White. I have regrets about 2: this must be at A, closer to Black. That would threaten B next.

When Black plays 3, it's surprisingly awkward for White to make eye shape. At this point, the game is probably dead even. White has to go all out.

White 10. White C would be more peaceful, but White lacks confidence.

Black 11 is a good move — I didn't see it.


Black 13 is also the only move. If instead Black pushes through at 14, White plays 2 and 4 in *Dia. 8* and is virtually alive, on top of which the defects in Black's shape become conspicuous.

Black 13 was the last move before lunch on the second day. I was telling myself that the game still had a long way to go. Yet I played the absurd moves of 18 and 20. Fujisawa Sensei said that my play gave him a stomachache — he was probably referring to this stage of the game.


White 18 had to be at D.

The timing of Black 21 is funny — perhaps my erratic play spread to Cho. Black should first atari at 1 in *Dia. 9*. When Black plays 3 and 5, the lack of eye shape of the white group becomes an immediate problem. It's completely unclear what will happen after White 6. I would have no confidence in White — it seems more promising for Black.

Cho was probably surprised that I linked up by giving him a ponnuki. From my point of view, it was a load off my mind. Presumably I took the lead here, but I'm inept at striking the finishing blow.



Dia. 9: White's prospects unclear



Dia. 10: good for White

Ceding the ko may be OK, but White 38 is slack. You'd expect White to make the probe of 1 in *Dia. 10*. If Black 2, White plays 3 and 5, then, with one eye glaring at the still-insecure black group, switches to 7. This would be good enough.

Also, instead of 40, you'd expect White to think seriously about ramming into Black with 41 or attaching at E.

I had also made a miscalculation in my position judgement. I thought that I was probably ahead, but actually the game was not very good for me. I also got a stomachache.





Figure 5 (151-180)



Dia. 11: better for Black

Figure 5 (151-180). Poised in the balance

Black 53. The hane of 1 in *Dia. 11* is surely more profitable. After 2 and 4, Black forces with 5, then switches elsewhere; the status of the white group is not settled, as Black can aim at 'a'. I had blithely assumed that the group probably wouldn't die.

White 58 is better left unplayed. When White pushes down at A, the 58-59 exchange is clearly a minus.

Black 65 surprised me. If Black had made the clear-cut forcing exchange of B and White C, then played 67-White 68-Black 71, the lead would have been unclear. Cho probably disliked the prospect of White's attaching at D after invading at 70, but I would have been too frightened to play a move like D, which could end up as a *mochikomi* (loss without compensation).

White 72 is a subtle point. I didn't feel like answering at the top, but I panicked a little when Black relentlessly pushed in with 73 etc.





Figure 6 (181-200)



Dia. 12: a big win 21: ko (below 4)

Figure 6 (181-200). White misses a chance.

White 82. White A is correct — White 93 after Black 83 makes a stronger shape.

Black 87. Black chooses a delicate juncture of the game for this forcing move. Actually, White could have counterattacked with 1 in Dia. 12. He lets Black capture with 6, then sets out to capture the top group with 7. The final result is a ko, but White ignores 20 and annihilates the top group with 21 and 23 for a big win.

Being short of time, as I was, is no excuse: not being able to read this out completely was slack. For that matter, I hadn't counted properly either.

Figure 7 (201-250). Miscounting by Takao

Black had a chance to exchange Black 8 for

White A before White played 8. The only thing is that Cho wanted to play Black 9-White 8-Black 12.

White 26 is worth $52/3$ points while Black 29 is worth $55/6$ — I can't even count! Instead of 26, I should have played White 41-Black B-White 29; this would have given me a win by $1\frac{1}{2}$ points or, at worst, a solid half point.




Figure 7 (201-250)

48: ko (at 44); 49: connects (below 23)




Figure 8 (251-305)

64: ko (below 61); 98: ko (at 92);

100: connects (at 95); 103: connects (at 56);

104: connects (at 61); 105: connects (at 90)

Figure 8 (251-305). Correct counting not enough

I couldn't calculate it, but Cho had read it all out properly. He said later that even if White



*The moment of victory.
Watching is Takemiya Masaki.*

played 58 at 59, he would have won the final half-point ko and the game by half a point.

It was not until I played 68 that I managed to work out that I had won by half a point. It was just by chance that things worked out right. If White plays 68 elsewhere, at 75, for example, he loses by half a point.

Black 69. If at 74, White plays 70 and wins by half a point.

I hadn't expected to win the title. I'm astonished. This astonishment feels good. Well, let me take custody of the Honinbo title for a year.

White wins by ½ point.

(Monthly Go World, August 2005)

Two days after this game, Takao visited Shuko's house to review the game with him. Shuko gave him a superb traditional go board as a present to commemorate this first title. However, he pointed to a special go board, one for which no price could be set, and said that if Takao won 'lots of titles, like Cho U', he would give it to him.

Asked by *Monthly Go World* about his first experience of playing two-day games, Takao replied: 'I learnt a lot. When you're watching as

a spectator, the players seem to have plenty of time and you feel envious, but, when you are actually playing, eight hours is not enough. It made me realize anew just how difficult go is. I like travelling, so it was fun travelling to different parts of Japan. But the return trips were tiring.'

Next, he was asked how he felt about this play in the series. 'By my standards, I played well. There are many moves I have regrets about, but I think I played up to my present strength.'

His future goals: 'My results in other tournaments are hopeless. I have to do something about this. I feel a responsibility, including for international tournaments.'

(Honinbo report translated by John Power)

Honinbo prize money

¥32,000,000

Recent results

(This list updates The Go Player's Almanac 2001.)

56th (2001). O Meien beat Cho U 4-3.

57th (2002). Kato Masao beat O 4-2.

58th (2003). Cho U beat Kato 4-2.

59th (2004). Cho beat Yoda Norimoto 4-2.

60th (2005). Takao Shinji beat Cho 4-1.




Cho looks rueful, perhaps pondering his

Tesujis for a Brighter Future (3)

Creating shortage of liberties with a cut

The subject of this instalment is the cut — not just any cut but an effective tesuji that leads the opponent into shortage of liberties.


Introduction: Problem A



Dia. 1: Black to play


Dia. 1. An easy problem to start with. How does Black exploit the defect in White's shape?

Dia. 2. If Black cuts at 1, White can't save his stones. If White 2, Black 3 — White has no answer.



Dia. 2: captured


Introduction: Problem B



Dia. 1: Black to play

Dia. 1. How does Black link up his stones?


Dia. 2. If Black cuts at 1, White can't save the two marked stones. If White 2, Black ataries at 3; if White 2 at 'a', Black ataries at 'b'. Either way, Black captures the marked pivotal stones.



Dia. 2. Attaching at 1 is useless; after White 2, Black can't save this stone. If instead Black plays 1 at 'a', White descends at 1, and Black can't stop him from linking up.

Dia. 3. Cutting at 1 is the tesuji, but the follow-up is important.

Dia. 4. If White 2, Black can cut off the stones to the left with 3 and 5. If Black carelessly ataries above 5 instead of 3, White answers at 3 and secures a connection. Instead of 2 —




Dia. 4: success

Dia. 5: profit

Dia. 5. White has to live with 2 to 6 here, letting Black take some profit on the side.

Problems


Problem 1



Black to play

Black's cut-off stones have only three liberties. If Black just fills in a liberty at the bottom, White will get four liberties and win the fight. What is the tesuji?


Problem 2



Black to play

This position is similar to but also different from the previous problem. Black can pull off something.


Problem 3



Black to play

Finding the cutting points is easy. The problem is to combine them in the right way.


Problem 4



Black to play

Black can exploit a defect in White's shape. A follow-up tesuji is also required.

Problem 5




Black to play

There's a move that brings the 'captured' black stones back to life.

Answers

Answer to Problem 1


Dia. 1. The aim of cutting at 1 is to reduce Black's liberties. It's a basic tesuji. If instead Black simply played at 'a', White would connect at 1 and win the capturing race.



Dia. 1: the only move Dia. 2: Black wins

Dia. 2. With any tesuji, the follow-up is all-important. After White 2, Black ataries at 3, then pulls back at 5. White has now been reduced to two liberties, so Black wins the fight.


Answer to Problem 2



Dia. 1: the only move

Dia. 1. The shape to the left is similar to the previous problem, but things are different on the right. It seems out of the question for Black's two stones with just two liberties to win a fight with the four white stones, which have four liberties, but Black 1 makes it possible.

If instead Black plays 1 at 'a', White plays 'b' and wins.




Dia. 2: shortage of liberties

Dia. 2. If White ataries the two black stones instead of 2, Black captures two white stones, and White can't get two eyes. That makes 2 the


only move, but then Black 3 is a clever sacrifice. White 4 is forced, so Black hanes at 5. White has no choice about 6 and 8, but now Black is ahead in the capturing race. Because of shortage of liberties, White can't atari — in effect, Black has three liberties.

Answer to Problem 3



Dia. 1: correct.


Dia. 1. If Black cuts at 3 instead of 1, White will play 'a' and be safe. Cutting with 1 before 3 is the correct timing. White is already doomed to lose something because of shortage of liberties. Next —



*Dia. 2: success
8: connects*

Dia. 2. If White 4, Black ataries with 5 and 7, setting up 9, which captures two stones.


Answer to Problem 4



Dia. 1: failure 8: connects


Dia. 1. Simply descending at 1 is too optimistic. Black can squeeze after cutting with 3, but he loses the capturing race with the corner

stones. Black 'a' after 9 is also unavailing: White answers at 'b' and is way ahead in this capturing race.




Dia. 2: correct

Dia. 2. Cutting at 1 is the tesuji. If White ataries at 'a' in response, Black extends at 2, capturing the two white stones on the side. This is actually the best White can do. If he ataries at 2, Black plays a follow-up tesuji with 3 — the nine white stones to the left are lost whatever White does next.



Dia. 3: captured

Dia. 3. If next White 4, Black descends at 5. White can't play in at 'a', so the stones to the left are lost.



Dia. 4: captured


Dia. 5. If White 4 here, Black 5 and 7 are both sente, so next Black can capture 4.

Answer to Problem 5


Dia. 1. Cutting at 1 leads White into shortage of liberties. White has three possible answers, 'a' to 'c', but Black has a counter for each.

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black 3 becomes the vital point. If White 4, the throw-in of 5 keeps White


short of liberties, so he can't save all his stones.



Dia. 1: the tesuji




Dia. 2: success



Dia. 3: success

Dia. 3. If White 2 here, attaching at 3 is the key move; if 4 next, Black 5 keeps White short of liberties, so his three stones to the left can't escape.

Dia. 4. The last move to look at is White 2 here. It's easily foiled: Black 3 and 5 keep White short of liberties.




Dia. 4: success

(*Monthly Go World*, March 2005. Translated by John Power.)

The Korean Style: Korean Joseki Innovations (10)


by Oya Koichi 9-dan

This is the tenth instalment in my series. Probably the most repeated comment has been, 'The Korean style is territorial.' I'm afraid that theme is going to be repeated in this issue, even if not in those words, so please bear with me.



Dia. 1: focus on the corner

Dia. 1. This opening is from a game between Yi Ch'ang-ho (white) and Yu Ch'ang-hyeok played in November 1997. It may look like nothing out of the ordinary, but please take a good look at the lower left corner. The small-knight approach move of 6 against a 3-4 stone has become rare in Japan.




Dia. 2: avoiding early fighting


Dia. 2. White makes the more restrained approach move of 1; if Black 'a', White 'b'. Alternatively, White could play 1 at 'c'. The idea in Japan is: why get into a messy fight early in the morning [i.e. just after the game starts]?

Actually, in the old days Japan was also pretty territory-oriented. When I was an insei, I always answered White 1 in *Dia. 3* by attaching at 2. The continuation to 5 is inevitable, and I


considered it the same as the joseki in *Dia. 4*. There's no need to explain. Everyone would probably laugh at me.



Dia. 3: helping White



Dia. 4: standard joseki



Dia. 5: follow-up aim

Dia. 5. It's as if, after 1 and 2, Black has exchanged 'a' for White 'b'. If Black has a stone at 'c', it becomes the strong move, aiming at the invasion at 'd', which I analysed in a slightly different position in the previous instalment. [Without a stone at 'c', Black 'a' just helps White.]

Let's go on to the main theme.

Dia. 6. The pincer of 2 is a standard move. No matter who looked at it, the conclusion should be that the result to 6 is even.


But — as we've seen time and again — in Korea this is considered a slack result for Black, as White has encroached upon the corner.

Going back to *Dia. 1*, the Shusaku-style diagonal move of 7 has been inherited by the Koreans. The big surprise comes with Black's response to 10, which we'll introduce a little later. Where do you think this move is played?


Dia. 7. Please lend your ears to a little more

prologue. Let's assume that White ignores Black 1 here and switches to 2. There's no way the marked white stone can be captured with just one more move. However, if White also ignores Black 3, the corner will almost certainly become black territory after Black 'a'.


That means that White 4 is natural.



Dia. 6: standard joseki




Dia. 7: one tenuki



Dia. 8: bad for Black

Dia. 8. Black 3 in *Dia. 7* at 1 here is out of


the question. White dodges to 2, so Black loses his target for attack.




Dia. 9: good for Black

Dia. 9. The second point to note is that if White plays 4 in *Dia. 7* at 1 here, then Black 4 is just right, so White will be dissatisfied. Black has defended the corner and has the marked stone lying in wait. White may have poked his head out into the centre, but his group remains vulnerable to attack.

Dia. 10. Locally, Black 2 is the strongest move. However, after White 3 and 5, Black is no longer able to play at 'a' — White answers at 'b', so Black 'a' becomes a bad move, trying to push through a knight's move. Note that White could also switch elsewhere with 3.




Dia. 10: Black loses 'a' Dia. 11: White can live 2: tenuki




Dia. 11. Black 3 is the only way to punish White for his tenuki, but White can still play at 4. You can see that Black 1 has now become a bad move.

Dia. 12. When White tenukies, the best continuation is to press at Black 1. The sequence to 4 is a nostalgic joseki.

Which side has gained? Since it's a joseki, the result must be equal, surely. Well, in Korea Black would be dissatisfied with this result.



Dia. 12: joseki Dia. 13: the Korean style




Dia. 13. If someone who had just learned go attached at 1, you'd smile and perhaps say something about not getting carried away. But if a

fierce-faced Korean professional played it, you'd tremble in your boots.


Black 1 was the next move after *Dia. 1*. It has two aims. One is to let White live small if he pleads for his life. If he prefers to move out, then Black takes the corner territory.

What a greedy move!

Dia. 14. White 1 is the most peaceful answer, but compare this result to *Dia. 12*. White had been forced into a low position, which is really painful. This result is no good for White.




Dia. 14: submissive




Dia. 15: bad shape

Dia. 15. Poking one's head out with 1 is a natural strategy, but White's shape crumbles when Black hanes and connects with 2 and 4. No matter how White defends the cutting point of 'a', he'll get bad shape, an empty triangle. This diagram has to be rejected, too.

Dia. 16. The only move left for White is the hane at 1. If Black 2, White has no choice but to play 3. The key point of this variation comes with Black 4. If White 5, Black forces with 6. The result couldn't be more painful: White has crawled submissively along the second line.



Dia. 16: too low




Dia. 17: in tatters

Dia. 17. White would really like to push up at 5, but then he has no answer to Black 6. If his momentum leads him to extend up at 7, Black cuts at 8, splitting up the white forces. The situation is already out of White's control.


Dia. 18. Pushing up at 2 the instant Black plays 1 is the only way White can resist. If he doesn't play this move, White can never hope to get an even result.

What's the trick? If you can read this out properly, you would be prefectural-representative level [i.e., be able to give a professional a good game on three stones]. The dénouement is a beautiful trade.



Dia. 18: resistance *Dia. 19: what White wants*

Dia. 19. Blocking at 3 looks natural, but this is just what White wants. The swift knife stab of 4 creates great aji for White. Thanks to this move, he can answer 7 by moving out with 8. Black can no longer cut at 'a', that is, 8 in *Dia. 17*.




Dia. 20: an even result

Dia. 20. Instead of 7 in *Dia. 19*, Black cuts at 1 here and White hanes at 2. This is the conclusion they have reached in Korea. It's presumably assessed as 50-50 because White is left with the endgame move of 'a', but to me this looks good for Black. For once, the new move, Black 1 in *Dia. 13*, is one I can recommend to my readers. There are hardly any difficult moves for Black, so why not try it out at your local go club? . . . I guess that's the usual way I wrap up my articles.

(Kido, April 1999. Translated by John Power.)


Dr. Paduk's Life-and-death Problem Answer

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the only move. White attacks with 2 in *Dia. 2*, but Black sacrifices three stones. The final shape is shown in *Dia. 3*.



Dia. 1


Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Three Problems


Problem 1



Black to play

To save his corner stones, Black has to capture the three white stones.

Problem 2




Black to play

How can Black live? This is a tricky problem — simply capturing two stones won't necessarily make two eyes.

Answers on page 68

Problem 3



Black to play

White: Tozawa Akinobu 7-dan; Black: Noguchi Hitoshi 5-dan. 1st King of the New Stars tournament (1975).

White has just played the stone marked with a triangle, but he has made an oversight. Black can capture the stone marked with a square. How does he go about it?

The 18th Fujitsu Cup (continued from page 11)




Figure 6 (201-245)

Figure 5 (201-245). Third victory for Yi

This was not a good game for Ch'oe: he's capable of much better, as his results show. In his defence, it should be mentioned that he had a bad cold, which may have handicapped him a little. Perhaps, also, he felt under too much pressure to win an international tournament. In Korea, you are not really recognized as a top player until you score some international triumphs. Still, even though he played a couple of what were, by his standards, bad moves, it was a very exciting game for the spectators.

Yi Se-tol commented: 'Even in international tournaments, I can play in my normal state of mind. That is linked to my good results.' With three victories in the Fujitsu Cup in four years, Yi Se-tol is no longer in the shadow of the older Yi.


White wins by 2½ points.

(The Yomiuri Newspaper. Translated by J. Power.)

Three Problems: Answers

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. The problem for Black is to stop the three white stones from moving out. If he attaches at 1, White counters with 2 and 4. If Black now hanes at 5, White could atari at 'a', as this wins the capturing race, but he might cut at 'b'. This cut will be hard to handle, so 5 is unreasonable — on top of losing the fight anyway.




Dia. 1: failure

Dia. 2: too slow

Dia. 2. Black 1 seals White in, but it loses the capturing race after White blocks at 2. Whether Black plays 3 or 3 at 4 or fills in an outside liberty makes no difference.

Dia. 3. Black has to fill in a liberty. Black 1 is the right answer — it combines well with the marked stone on the first line.




Dia. 3: correct

Dia. 4: success

Dia. 4. If White pushes down with 2, Black counters with 3 etc., keeping White short of liberties and capturing him.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Black must atari on the left with 1. This looks a little strange, so it may be a blind spot, but it is the only way to live.




Dia. 1: the only move

Dia. 2: Black lives

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black 3 is a clever move. White 4 is forced, so Black lives with 5.

Dia. 3. If White 2, Black makes his second eye with 3 and 5.




Dia. 3: alive

Dia. 4: alive

Dia. 4. White 2 doesn't work either.

Dia. 5. If Black ataries on the other side, he can't live.




Dia. 5: dead

Dia. 6: dead

Dia. 6. If Black blocks at 1, he loses the capturing race.

Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. When Black ataries at 1, White naturally extends at 2, but he is already trapped. Black forces with 3 and 5, then sets up a geta with 7. White can't escape. Thanks to the stone at 5, pushing down to the left of 2 doesn't work for White.



Dia. 1: a geta

Dia. 2: no escape

Dia. 2. If White 1, Black hanes at 2, and White is helpless.

(Igo Mirai, date unknown; Igo Club, July 1998; Kido, 1975)

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Compiled and written by Richard Bozulich

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There are two approaches to presenting tesujis problems. One approach is to collect problems according to the objective that tesujis accomplish. The other is to collect problems according to the kind of tesuji used. In this book the emphasis is on the latter.

There are about 45 different kinds of moves that make up tesujis. Each of these moves has a Japanese term that describes them. Some of these tesujis occur quite frequently in games, while others are seldom seen. In this book, I have attempted to present examples of every kind of tesuji. The more common ones occur in numerous problems, but even the less common ones will be represented a number of times. Every tesuji presented in this book can be found among the first 50 problems.

All of these different tesujis are scattered throughout the book. Just as in a game, one never knows what kind of tesuji will appear. It may be easy to find it, but often it is hard; it might be a quite common tesuji, but it could be one of those that rarely occur. Going through the 501 tesujis in this book will be like getting a tesuji experience in 501 games. In a game, however, many tesujis will go by unnoticed; in this book, each problem will be a learning experience.

Many of the problems are easy, but many are hard. I recommend that you make an effort to solve each problem before looking at the answer, but don't spend too much time on them. The important thing is to expose yourself to the tesuji. As you work your way through this book, you will find that the tesujis that solve the problems will appear to you more and more quickly. Once you have reached this level, the same thing will start happening in your games.

304 pages; price: US\$18.00 + shipping; ISBN 4-906574-74-2

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